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The Interface of Open Source and Proprietary 
Agricultural Innovation: Facilitated Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Under the New FAO Treaty 
Charles R. McManis  
Eul Soo Seo  
INTRODUCTION: PLANT INNOVATION AND PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES 
The origin of plant innovation
1
 traces back to primitive cropping 
and domestication of plants for food—to the very beginnings of 
agriculture. For millennia since then, farmers have selected naturally 
occurring variants that have shown higher yield or seemed better 
adapted for cultivation and have replanted seeds of those variants for 
the following season‘s cultivation. The resulting cultivars and 
landraces are important not only as sources of seeds for local farming 
but also as genetic resources for further plant innovation.
2
  
 
  Thomas & Karole Green Professor of Law, Director of Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Program, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. My thanks to 
Kate Hart, J.D. (2009), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, for her research 
assistance during the final stages of this Article‘s preparation for publication.  
  Director, Convergence Technology Examination Division, Korean Intellectual 
Property Office (KIPO), Korea. J.S.D. (2007), Washington University in St. Louis. 
 1. In this Article, the term ―plant innovation‖ is used to mean all forms of invention and 
development relating to plants. Therefore, it includes the creation of new plant varieties, 
whether by genetic modification or more conventional plant-breeding techniques, and any new 
techniques or processes for creating same. 
 2. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 2 (2d ed. 2004) (―Over thousands of years the slow but steady 
accumulation of advantageous genes produced more productive cultivars.‖). A ―cultivar‖ may 
be defined as ―a cultivated variety of a domesticated crop plant (species or subspecies), which is 
clearly distinguishable from others by one or more characteristic and that, when reproduced, 
retains its distinguishing characteristics,‖ whereas a ―landrace‖ is ―a farmer-developed variety 
of a crop plant that is evolved from a wild population, heterogeneous and adapted to local 
environmental conditions.‖ Muriel S. B. Lightbourne, The FAO International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Towards Food Security, Conservation, Equity? 36 
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Historically, new cultivars and landraces largely have been treated 
as common property or the common heritage of humankind, and as 
such have been freely shared among farmers.
3
 However, the era of 
free and unencumbered access to new plant varieties appears to be 
passing. Scientific plant breeding, which was triggered by the 
rediscovery of the Mendelian Laws of Heredity,
4
 has drastically 
shifted the responsibility for plant innovation from farmers to public 
agricultural research organizations and, in recent years, to private 
plant-breeding companies. The advent of genetic engineering and 
agricultural biotechnology in particular have added important tools to 
the plant breeder‘s toolbox and are likely to accelerate the 
specialization and privatization of plant breeding.
5
 
Plant materials themselves have been a fundamental resource for 
human survival throughout history. Most people in the world still 
―obtain a large share of their calories and nutrients from food [made] 
 
(June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen Mary, University of London) (on file with 
author). Lightbourne goes on to point out that ―[t]he genetic variability of landraces is precisely 
what makes them interesting for plant breeders and farmers, especially those located in difficult 
environments; it is also what contributes to more stable yields from year to year than those of 
commercial varieties, although on a yearly basis, these yields are inferior to those of the 
commercial varieties.‖ Id. For a scientific definition of ―plant genetic resources‖ and the 
associated term, ―plant germplasm,‖ see infra notes 30 and 35. 
 3. See Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with 
Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 777–78 
(2007) [hereinafter Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic] (―Prior to 1982, ‗raw‘ seed germplasm 
was generally considered and legally regarded as the ‗common heritage of mankind.‘ . . . As 
such, farmers, plant breeders, and agriculturalist scientists could freely access and use raw seed 
germplasm without qualification.‖ (citation omitted)). For a more recent, book-length 
examination of the interface of plant innovation and plant genetic resources, see KEITH AOKI, 
SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2008) [hereinafter AOKI, SEED WARS]. 
 4. The laws of plant inheritance were first discovered by the Austrian monk Gregor 
Mendel (1822–1884) and revealed that all characteristics are inherited through indivisible genes 
contributed by each parent to its offspring in sexually reproducing species. Mendel‘s work was 
largely ignored but was rediscovered by agronomists in Europe and the United States around 
the turn of the twentieth century. See Keith Aoki, Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto: Intellectual 
Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food Supply: An Introduction, 19 J. ENV‘TL L. & 
LITIG. 397, 401 (2004). See generally ROBERT OLBY, ORIGINS OF MENDELISM (2d ed. 1985). 
For an account of the rediscovery of Mendel‘s Laws of Heredity in the early 1900s, see infra 
note 40. 
 5. See KLOPPENBURG, JR., supra note 2, at 2–4 (describing that new genetic technologies 
poise us ―on the edge of an era in which humanity will be ‗making natural history‘ in a much 
more complete sense of the phrase‖). 
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from plants and plant parts.‖6 Approximately half of the world‘s 
medicines are estimated to contain compounds of plant origin.
7
 
Recently, plant materials have been recognized as an important 
source of biofuels, which could provide an alternative to the world‘s 
reliance on limited fossil fuels.
8
  
Although plant innovation is critical for a variety of industries, it 
is also vulnerable to unauthorized copying. Plant innovation is 
initially costly and time-consuming to produce but is relatively easy 
and inexpensive to reproduce. For that reason, the availability and 
scope of intellectual property protection for plant innovation has 
important implications for stimulating plant innovation by plant 
breeders.
9
  
One of the most heated aspects of the international debate over 
extending intellectual property protection to the innovations of plant 
breeders concerns how to balance the intellectual property claims of 
plant breeders with countervailing claims to a fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of preexisting plant 
genetic resources (―PGRs‖) contributed by farmers and others. In 
 
 6. Wallace Huffman, Economics of Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Materials 2 
(Iowa State Univ. Dep‘t of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06016, 2006), 
available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_12583_06016.pdf. 
 7. Bonwoo Koo & Brian D. Wright, Dynamic Implications of Patenting for Crop 
Genetic Resources 1 (Int‘l Food Policy Research Inst., EPTP, Discussion Paper No. 51, 1999), 
available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp51.pdf. 
 8. See Don Looper & Aaron Ball, Feel the Heat: Biofuels Are a Hot Investment, But 
Don‟t Get Burned . . ., 44 HOUSTON LAW. 22, 25–27 (2007) (―The . . . 97 ethanol plants [in the 
U.S.] are operating at capacity, and an additional 33 plants are under construction.‖); Judy 
Keen, Midwest Farms Reap Benefits of Ethanol Boom, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2006, at 10A 
(―U.S. plants can produce more than 5 billion gallons of ethanol per year, and that number will 
rise sharply as new facilities come on line.‖). 
 9. See Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration 
of Data and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research 
and Development, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 786 (U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 
2004, at 51, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib786/aib786.pdf (―Estimates of 
the time involved in producing new varieties in a breeding program range from 10 to 15 years 
to produce a marketable product. . . . On an annual basis, a small breeding program was 
estimated to cost approximately $250,000 in the late 1980s, a sum adequate to cover the costs 
of a chief breeder, a staff of three or four, equipment, facilities and land. . . . Even where larger 
firms realize economies of scale and scope in producing multiple varieties, the estimated 
development costs of a new variety range between $2.0 million and $2.5 million for the same 
period. . . . Given the magnitude of these investments, it is unlikely that plant breeders would 
have made this type of R&D investment without property rights protection.‖ (citations 
omitted)). 
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response to this often acrimonious North-South debate—in which 
Northern accusations of intellectual property ―piracy‖ in the 
developing world are regularly met with counter-accusations of 
―biopiracy‖ on the part of innovators in the industrialized world—the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (―ITPGRFA‖), was promulgated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (―FAO‖) on 
November 2, 2001, and entered into force on June 29, 2004. The 
ITPGRFA represents the first binding international agreement 
attempting to address this issue by introducing a ―Multilateral 
System‖ for facilitating access to and benefit-sharing arising out of 
the use of selected PGRs.
10
  
The FAO Multilateral System is particularly noteworthy because 
it represents the first international attempt to combine an open source 
system of facilitated access to PGRs with a mandatory system of 
benefit-sharing, including mandatory sharing of monetary and other 
benefits arising out of commercialization of certain patent-protected 
plant innovation, thus implicitly recognizing a role for intellectual 
property protection and proprietary plant innovation in generating 
monetary benefits to maintain the open source system. This Article 
will critically examine how effectively the new ITPGRFA combines 
these open source and proprietary elements and will conclude by 
comparing this commendable, albeit imperfect, Multilateral System 
 
 10. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, adopted 
Nov. 3, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-19, ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf [hereinafter 
ITPGRFA], states in Article 1 that its objectives are ―the conservation and sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity,‖ which had 
been promulgated by the United Nations Environmental Programme and opened for signature at 
the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, and stated similar objectives with respect to biological diversity more generally. See 
Convention on Biological Diversity (with annexes), opined for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD]. However, as will be discussed in more detail, infra notes 59–
64, 106–20, 139–40 and accompanying text, the FAO International Treaty and the CBD take 
two very different approaches to meeting their common objectives. Whereas the CBD explicitly 
recognizes the sovereign rights of its members to exploit their own genetic resources, and thus 
encourages bilateral agreements between industrialized and developing countries to facilitate 
access to genetic resources and an equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of 
these resources, the FAO International Treaty establishes a ―Multilateral System‖ for 
facilitating access to and an equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of PGRs for food 
and agriculture. 
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with its potentially bipolar alternative—namely, the continuation of 
current controversies over the patentability of genetic materials and 
over reactive assertions of sovereignty over plant genetic resources. 
I. OVERVIEW OF PLANT INNOVATION, PGRS, AND THE LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF SAME 
A. Social and Economic Significance of Plant Innovation and PGRs 
The historic transformation of agriculture in many developing 
countries from traditional farming to industrialized agriculture 
methods occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, in what is commonly 
called the Green Revolution,
11
 and is frequently cited 
(notwithstanding some significant unintended adverse environmental 
consequences) as one of the more successful examples of utilizing 
PGRs to stimulate plant innovation in the agricultural field.
12
 
Unquestionably, the Green Revolution has led to significant increases 
in the world‘s food supply. ―Total food production in developing 
countries more than doubled between 1960 and 1985, and food 
production more than kept pace with burgeoning population 
growth.‖13 In one recent example, Brazil drastically enhanced its 
soybean production by introducing heat-tolerant varieties of soybean 
in its farmlands in 1997. As a result, Brazil is presently second in the 
 
 11. The Green Revolution began with the development of a new set of high-yield varieties 
by the international crop-breeding institutions established in Mexico and the Philippines 
between the 1940s and 1960s with the support of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.  
These institutions produced new varieties of rice, wheat, and corn that were more 
responsive than traditional varieties to synthetic fertilizers and controlled irrigation. 
The new varieties were quickly adopted in many parts of the developing world, and 
resulted in dramatic increases in food production. By the 1990s, about 70% of the 
world‘s corn, over 50% of the wheat produced in Asia and Latin America, and almost 
75% of the rice cultivated in Asia consisted of the new varieties.  
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The 
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
419, 440–41 (2004) (citations omitted); see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
 12. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 158–59. For a discussion of the unintended 
adverse environmental consequences of the Green Revolution, see infra notes 19–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. Gonzalez, supra note 11, at 441. 
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world‘s soybean production and is expected to surpass the United 
States soon.
14
 
The pharmaceutical industry has also been cited as one of the 
major beneficiaries of PGRs. Human beings have a long history of 
relying strongly upon the materials of various plants to deal with 
illnesses. Many recently manufactured synthetic medicines drew their 
―chemical blueprints‖ from ―natural plant materials before they were 
reproduced in the laboratory.‖15 
Above all, PGRs have particular significance for global ―food 
security‖16 because of their use as raw materials for improving 
productivity of crops. The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (―OECD‖) reports that ―[w]orld agricultural 
production to 2010 is expected to grow at an average rate of around 
1.8 percent a year, a slower pace than in preceding decades but fast 
enough to improve per capita food production as world population 
growth gradually loses momentum.‖17 Of the many factors affecting 
the future food supply, farmers‘ access to improved crop varieties is 
among the most important.
18
 Thus, for a sustainable world food 
supply, it is critical to conserve PGRs and to use them to develop new 
varieties. 
Unfortunately, despite the highly recognized significance of 
PGRs, scientists worry that the number of PGRs in the world has 
declined, and some varieties are reportedly near extinction, or are 
 
 14. See Scott Wallace, Last of the Amazon, NAT‘L GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 2007, at 60. 
 15. David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The International Legal Regime for Plant 
Resources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 373, 376 (1998).  
 16. The definition of the term ―food security‖ is somewhat controversial. While the World 
Food Summit held in 1996 defines food security as ―physical and economic access by all people 
at all times to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life,‖ there is 
a popular misconception that food insecurity is caused by food scarcity. Gonzalez, supra note 
11, at 428 (citations omitted). 
 17. Reza Lahidji et al., The Future of Food: An Overview of Trends and Key Issues, in 
THE FUTURE OF FOOD: LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AGRO-FOOD SECTOR 7, 7 (Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation and Dev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF FOOD]. 
 18. Per Pinstrup-Andersen & Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Major Uncertainties and Risks 
Affecting Long-term Food Supply and Demand, in THE FUTURE OF FOOD, supra note 17, at 53, 
64. For examples of some of the unintended consequences of farmer access to improved plant 
varieties, however, see generally Glenn Davis Stone, The Birth and Death of Traditional 
Knowledge: Paradoxical Effects of Biotechnology in India, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 207 (Charles R. 
McManis ed., 2007) [hereinafter BIODIVERSITY & THE LAW]. 
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already extinct, due to the effects of increased population growth and 
industrial agriculture.
19
 Rapid urbanization, industrialization, and 
pollution that accompany the continued increase in the world‘s 
population are detrimental to the conservation of PGRs.
20
 Rapid 
increases in the human population compel more people to move from 
rural areas to the cities and also to encroach upon natural preserves. 
The amount of PGRs in the world is also said to be seriously 
shrinking due to a variety of pollutants, which exist due to the growth 
in industry, ranging from direct emission of carbon dioxide to the 
discharge of toxic substances into waterways and soil.
21
  
Genetic erosion due to industrial agriculture is an additional 
concern.
22
 Genetic uniformity resulting from mono-cropping over 
large areas in the world arguably accelerates genetic erosion, 
―displacing thousands of local varieties, often in those very 
communities where plant genetic diversity is greatest, as local 
farmers turn to the use of modern [elite] seeds.‖23 Commentators 
worry that the introduction of hybridization has begun to degrade the 
genetic diversity in the farmlands of developed countries, and that the 
Green Revolution threatens to bring about genetic erosion in 
developing countries as well.
24
 
 
 19. See June Starr & Kenneth C. Hardy, Not by Seeds Alone: The Biodiversity Treaty and 
The Role for Native Agriculture, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 85, 94 (1993). For a recent, detailed 
discussion of the genetic erosion hypothesis, including citation to commentators who argue that 
the hypothesis is ―plausible but nowhere documented,‖ see Lightbourne, supra note 2, at 94–
100. 
 20. Starr & Hardy, supra note 19, at 94. 
 21. Id. at 95. 
 22. Genetic Resources in Agriculture: The Key to Food Security, FAO NEWSROOM, June 
8, 2006, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/1000316/index.html (―Throughout 
history, human beings have used some 10 000 [sic] plant species for food; today, our diet is 
based on just over 100 species, due to the introduction of a small number of modern and 
enormously uniform commercial varieties.‖). 
 23. Starr & Hardy, supra note 19, at 95–96 (citation omitted). But compare Lightbourne, 
supra note 2, at 98 (citing commentators who argue that ―the genetic erosion hypothesis is 
‗plausible but nowhere documented.‘‖). At the same time, Lightbourne recounts several 
troubling examples of the near-extinction of potentially valuable landraces. Id. at 96–97 (rice), 
284 (soy); see also infra note 28. 
 24. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 6–7. Professor Kloppenburg describes the 
negative social and environmental impacts of Green Revolution as ―the exacerbation of regional 
inequalities, generation of income inequalities at the farm level, increased scales of operation, 
specialization of production, displacement of labor, accelerating mechanization, depressed 
product prices, changing tenure patterns, rising land prices, expanding markets for commercial 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The arguably increasing rate of plant species extinction ushers in 
the possibility of an ―irreversible loss of genetic resources that may 
someday be of immense value to agriculture, biology, medicine, and 
industry,‖ which means that ―modern farming stands to lose the 
fundamental building blocks needed to produce the crops of 
tomorrow.‖25 The World Watch Institute points out that ―[p]robably 
the most immediate threat to human welfare posed by the loss of 
biological diversity arises from the shrinkage of the plant gene pools 
available to agricultural scientists and farmers.‖26 To the extent that 
the PGRs pool shrinks, the search costs for new genes to be used for 
the development of novel plant varieties will increase. Eventually, the 
opportunity to breed higher-yield crops will decrease, and prices of 
agricultural products will increase.
27
 Thus, continued efforts to 
conserve PGRs in situ and ex situ and to use them safely and 
efficiently are instrumental in securing human welfare against the 
extinction of PGRs.
28
 
With the increased recognition of the economic significance of 
PGRs comes the increasingly complex struggle to strike a balance 
between the interests of developing countries, which house most raw 
genetic materials and seek remuneration for supplying them, and 
developed countries, which have most of the biotechnological know-
how and are pressing for free access, open markets, and stronger 
intellectual property rights protection for plant innovation.
29
  
 
inputs, agrichemical dependence, genetic erosion, pest-vulnerable monocultures, and 
environmental deterioration.‖ Id. at 6. 
 25. Starr & Hardy, supra note 19, at 86–87, 96. 
 26. Id. at 96 (quoting ERIK ECKHOLM, DISAPPEARING SPECIES: THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE 
12 (Worldwatch Paper 22, 1978)). 
 27. Id. at 98. 
 28. Interestingly, the Norwegian government recently announced its plan to build the 
Svalbard International Seed Vault, a so-called ―doomsday vault,‖ inside a mountain on an 
Arctic island to save ―all known varieties of the world‘s crops.‖ It is aimed ―to withstand global 
catastrophes like nuclear war or natural disasters that would destroy the planet‘s sources of 
food.‖ See „Doomsday‟ Seed Bank to Be Built, BBC NEWS (London), Jan. 12, 2006, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4605398.stm. But cf. Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on 
Horseback: Biodiversity Loss and the Law, in BIODIVERSITY & THE LAW, supra note 18, at 42, 
52 (noting that ―[i]n situ preservation remains the only effective way to save biodiversity‖). 
 29. See Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership 
of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 591–92 (1993); James O. Odek, Bio-piracy: 
Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 143 (1994); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/13
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B. PGRs: Who Contributes Them, Who Develops Them, Who Owns 
Them? 
Farmers‘ crops have contributed to the enrichment of the global 
store of PGRs
30
 through the cumulated mass selection of plants ever 
since agriculture began. Humans began cultivating plants and 
exchanging seeds for food and agriculture in Neolithic times or 
earlier. While primeval farmers undertook their cultivation with a 
relatively small number of plant species, genetic diversity has 
flourished as crops developed through millennia of exchanges and 
resulting mass selection designed to meet changing environments and 
human preferences. These PGRs have been, and continue to be, 
central to the viability of major agricultural crops in the lives of 
human beings.
31
 
Farmers have thus used artificial selection to intensively 
accelerate the ongoing process of natural selection. Farmers‘ 
cumulative efforts resulted in high levels of plant inter- and intra-
specific genetic variability in particular and relatively confined 
geographic areas, known as ―Vavilov centers of genetic diversity.‖32 
 
Amy Nelson, Note, Is There an International Solution to Intellectual Property Protection for 
Plants?, 37 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 997, 1006–07 (2005). 
 30. Scientifically, the term ―plant genetic resources‖ refers to the genetic information 
found in gene alleles of living plant cells. This genetic material is found in every living cell of 
every plant. PGRs have economic significance because of their actual and potential value to 
industry, medicine, agriculture, and energy development. Thus, PGRs encompass both 
identified and unidentified ranges of plant germplasm available in the global gene pool. See 
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 46; H. Garrison Wilkes, Plant Genetic Resources over Ten 
Thousand Years: From a Handful of Seed to the Crop-Specific Mega-Genebanks, in SEEDS AND 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 67, 79 (Jack R. 
Kloppenburg, Jr., ed., 1988). The ITPGRFA also defines genetic material as ―any material of 
plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing functional 
units of heredity.‖ ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 2. In this Article, the term ―plant genetic 
resources‖ will be used, as distinguished from the term ―plant innovation,‖ which is generally 
understood as the introduction of something new or useful, for example introducing new 
methods, techniques, or practices or new or altered products, into the previous plant genetic 
resources or plant innovations. 
 31. See CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF 
GENETIC DIVERSITY 8 (1990). 
 32. ―The existence of such areas was first identified in the 1920s by the Soviet botanist N. 
I. Vavilov.‖ KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 46. Through a series of botanical expeditions all 
over the world, he located a variety of areas where a bounty of wild relatives of cultivated crops 
was living. These areas are considered to be the centers of origin of particular crops where they 
were domesticated and initially evolved under cultivation. See id. at 46–49. 
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Although the concept of Vavilov centers is sometimes challenged by 
new data, there is a considerable consensus among crop scientists that 
cradle areas of crop domestication are identifiable and reasonably 
well known.  
While genetic resources [may be] found in all farming systems, 
they are particularly valuable and abundant in Vavilov Centers 
. . . . because of their on-going processes of crop evolution, 
such as gene flow between wild relatives and cultivated types 
and decentralized selection by farmers.
33
 
Farmers and consumers in other parts of the world have also 
enjoyed the benefits of PGRs derived from Vavilov centers.
34
 The 
diffusion of plant germplasm
35
 beyond these Vavilov centers was 
accomplished through the exchange of seeds among farmers, forming 
one of the dominant patterns of crop evolution. The incessant quest 
for new crops and crop varieties to overcome the obstacles to crop 
production has propelled the diffusion of PGRs throughout the world. 
As each country recognized the remarkable economical importance 
of PGRs, pubic sectors such as governments, national gardens and 
public research institutes have also augmented each nation‘s role in 
exploring and collecting new crop resources.  
In 1493, Christopher Columbus inaugurated what came to be 
called the ―Columbian Exchange‖ in the diffusion of PGRs from the 
New World to European countries, bringing maize, beans, potatoes, 
 
 33. Stephen B. Brush, Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, 17 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL‘Y 59, 61 (2005) (arguing that ―conservation and protection of traditional knowledge 
associated with‖ Vavilov centers is critical to keep global plant genetic resources). 
 34. For example, maize and cassava cultivated in Africa and Asia have their origin in 
MesoAmerica and the Amazon Basin, respectively, and farmers in North America grow rice 
originating in Asia and sorghum originating in Africa. Id. at 61. 
 35. ―Plant germplasm‖ encompasses the sum total of the heritable basis of a species or 
variety of plants. This term is generally used by plant breeders and geneticists to describe the 
genetic stocks within a species of plants collectively. See JOHN MILTON POEHLMAN, BREEDING 
FIELD CROPS 4–5 (3d ed. 1987). In this Article, the term ―plant germplasm‖ is used 
interchangeably with ―plant genetic resources.‖ To a large extent, they mean the same thing. 
The German biologist August Weismann (1834–1914) first used the term ―germplasm‖ in order 
to ―describe a component of germ cells that he proposed were responsible for heredity, roughly 
equatable to our modern understanding of DNA.‖ Wikipedia, Germplasm, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Germ_plasm (last visited Jan. 17, 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing 415 
 
 
squash, sweet potatoes, cassava, and peanut seeds back to Europe.
36
 
Beginning in the sixteenth century, the rapid expansion of European 
colonialism significantly boosted the amount, rapidity, formalization 
and institutionalization of crop diffusion.
37
 Many plant explorers 
conducted expeditions to collect economically important plants from 
the New World. Although the plant collection and exchange that 
occurred during these expeditions appears to have been viewed as a 
―normal part of diplomatic and economic intercourse among 
nations,‖ such missions subsequently have been pilloried for their 
―colonial or imperial intentions,‖38 as the Columbian Exchange 
resulted in plantation economies in the colonies, while 
simultaneously contributing to the feeding of the swelling population 
in Europe.
39
 
As a result of the discovery of the basic principles of inheritance 
in plant genetics in the early twentieth century, public plant breeding 
programs brought about of the direct introduction of exotic plant 
germplasm. This newly fledged plant genetic science, based upon re-
discovery of Mendelism,
40
 fundamentally changed PGRs ―from a 
 
 36. Professor Alfred Crosby describes this event as ―the Columbian Exchange,‖ 
emphasizing the two-way nature of transfers of germplasm, including transfers from Europe to 
the Americas of crops such as wheat, rye, and oats. See ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN 
EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1492, at 67 (30th Anniversary ed. 
2003). 
 37. Id. at 65–67. 
 38. See Brush, supra note 33, at 63. 
 39. See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 247, 262 (2003). Professor Jack Kloppenburg points out that 
―plant germplasm is a resource that reproduces itself, and a single ‗taking‘ of germplasm could 
provide the material base upon which whole new sectors of production could be elaborated,‖ 
and explains that ―new crops from the Americas certainly played an important role in feeding a 
European population that nearly doubled between 1750 and 1850 as the Industrial Revolution 
swept people off the land and into Marx‘s ‗dark, satanic mills.‘‖ KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, 
at 154, 156. 
 40. ―Mendelism‖ refers to the laws of plant inheritance first discovered by Gregor 
Mendel, who conducted extensive plant hybridity experiments. Through his experiments with 
some twenty-eight thousand pea plants between 1856 and 1863, he concluded that all 
characteristics are inherited through indivisible genes contributed by each parent to its offspring 
in sexually reproducing species. Mendel‘s result was largely neglected during his lifetime, but, 
after the work was rediscovered in 1900 by three European scientists, Hugo de Vries, Carl 
Correns, and Erich von Tschermak, the importance of his studies was recognized as a major 
breakthrough. Aoki, supra note 4, at 401 n.9 (citing KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 68–69). 
Mendel‘s discoveries later became known as Mendel‘s Laws of Heredity, Mendelism or 
Mendelian inheritance. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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possible source of new production to a probable source.‖41 Due to the 
significant increase of private sector agricultural research investment 
over the last thirty years or so, major private companies currently are 
taking the lead in plant breeding. However, because the public and 
private sectors have coexisted from the beginning of modern 
scientific plant breeding, the important role of the public sector in 
plant breeding will likely continue, especially in the following areas: 
education and training of plant breeders, plant breeding methodology 
development, and plant germplasm preservation and development.
42
 
The rediscovery of the Mendelism, which changed plant breeding 
―from a practical ‗art‘ into a ‗science,‘‖ significantly stimulated the 
emerging private seed business.
43
 The subsequent development of 
hybrid seed further prompted rapid growth in the nascent seed 
business, affording a technical solution to the ―problem‖ posed by the 
self-reproducibility of the seed, as second- and third-generation 
hybrid progeny produce drastically lower yields, thus enabling 
private seed breeders to protect their inbred lines as trade secrets.
44
 
The advent of plant biotechnology in the 1980s led to an increase 
in the market share of major plant-breeding companies and the 
involvement of large chemical companies in the seed industry, 
spurred by confirmation of the patentability of living organisms.
45
 
 
 41. Brush, supra note 33, at 63–64 (―Vavilov was one of the first crop scientists to 
recognize and promote this idea.‖); see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that 
―[p]lant breeding began to move from a craft foundation to a truly scientific basis with the 
rediscovery of Mendel‘s work in 1900‖). 
 42. See generally Paul W. Heisey et al., Public Sector Plant Breeding in a Privatizing 
World, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 722 (U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., Washington D.C.), Aug. 2001, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib772/aib772.pdf; Gurdev S. Khush, 
Biotechnology: Public-Private Partnerships and Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of 
Developing Countries, in BIODIVERSITY & THE LAW, supra note 18, at 179. 
 43. Aoki, supra note 39, at 268. 
 44. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 2, at 11, 91–94, 130 (―Hybridization has proved to be 
an eminently effective technological solution to the biological barrier that historically had 
prevented more than a minimum of private investment in crop improvement.‖); Debra L. Blair, 
Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
297, 304–05 (1999) (―In 1926, Henry Wallace set up the Hi-Bred Corn Co. (now Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, Inc.) in Des Moines, Iowa, and marketed the first hybrid seed corn.‖ 
(quoting CURTIS NORSKOG, HYBRID SEED CORN ENTERPRISES: A BRIEF HISTORY 69 (Maracom 
Corp. 1995))). 
 45. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that the patent 
laws enacted by Congress were broad enough to allow a man-made microorganism to be 
patented); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., TRACKING THE TREND TOWARDS MARKET 
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Large chemical companies such as Monsanto and Dupont became 
major producers in the seed industry by ―either purchasing seed 
companies or building alliances with seed companies in an effort to 
better market their chemical and biotechnology products.‖46 
Consequently, through these technological and institutional changes 
over the past century, private companies now play a larger role in the 
development of new plant innovation than the public sector, at least 
in the developed world.
47
 
From the late nineteenth century until the late twentieth century, 
PGRs generally were considered part of the public domain. Under 
this public domain, or ―common heritage of mankind,‖ concept, 
PGRs were available for the use of all, as a kind of global genetic 
commons, and were not thought to be subject to the sovereignty of 
any country.
48
 Researchers could collect and use samples of genetic 
material without restrictions.
49
 However, as intellectual property 
protection was extended to an ever-widening array of genetic 
 
CONCENTRATION: THE CASE OF THE AGRICULTURAL INPUT INDUSTRY 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditccom200516_en.pdf (―Many [large chemical companies] 
branched out into seeds because of declining margins in the agrichemical market, and the 
increasing profit potentials of the seed market.‖); Blair, supra note 44, at 323–26. 
 46. Blair, supra note 44, at 323 (―For example, Monsanto purchased Holden Foundations 
Seeds for just over $1 billion, the remaining sixty percent share of DeKalb that it did not 
already own it purchased for $2.3 billion, and now Monsanto has joined with Cargill in ‗a 
marketing and research joint venture worth perhaps $200 million over five years.‘ Monsanto 
now owns DeKalb Genetics, Holden‘s Foundation Seeds, Asgrow, and Delta & Pine Land Co. 
(bought for $1.9 billion in 1998). In addition, Monsanto had approximately a fifty-five percent 
equity investment with Calgene, then went on to purchase the rest in April 1997. Monsanto also 
purchased the ‗crop biotech assets of W.R. Grace & Co.‘s Agracetus unit‘ in April 1996.‖ 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 47. See Fernandez-Cornejo, supra note 9, at 42 (explaining that, from 1960 to 1996, 
private companies‘ expenditure in agricultural R&D increased by 224%, while the public 
sector‘s increased by 97%, and annual R&D expenditure of private companies has exceeded the 
public sector‘s every year since 1982); Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public-Private Structure of 
Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 989, 994 
(2003) (noting that internationally, while the private sector has generated 74% of the 
intellectual property in agricultural biotechnology, the public sector accounts for just 24%). 
 48. See AOKI, SEED WARS, supra note 3, at 99–103. (distinguishing the public domain, or 
global commons, from the concept of a ―limited commons‖); Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership 
in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The International Conflict to Control the Building 
Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 641, 644–45 (2004). 
 49. Safrin, supra note 48, at 645. However, because the public domain concept did not 
necessarily grant researchers ―the right to trespass on private or state property to obtain genetic 
samples,‖ researchers did have to obtain ―any consent normally required before entering such 
property.‖ Id. 
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materials, the traditional paradigm that PGRs formed part of the 
public domain gave way to an enclosure of such resources as 
property.
50
 Presently, intellectual property rights in a number of 
countries extend to new plants and to isolated and purified plant 
genes.
51
 
Many scholars have argued that the proliferation of overlapping 
patents could create patent ―thickets‖ that block the broad 
dissemination of new discoveries and stifle further technological 
advancement.
52
 Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, for example, 
assert that transaction costs for downstream innovation are increased 
as a result of a ―tragedy of anti-commons,‖ which emerges when 
―multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce 
resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.‖53 Thus far, 
however, this concern does not appear to be fully supported by 
empirical evidence.
54
 In contrast, the recent biotechnology upsurge in 
the United States supports the proposition that ―privatization of 
research tools is essential for the continued success of the 
biotechnology industry and stimulates rather than stifles 
commercialization of useful products.‖55 Likewise, various empirical 
 
 50. See id. at 645–46; Odek, supra note 29, at 149. 
 51. For example, in the United States, the creator of a new plant variety can seek 
intellectual property rights under utility patent, plant patent and plant variety legislation. See 
Safrin, supra note 48, at 641 (―By mid-2000, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office . . . had 
issued over six thousand patents on full-length genes isolated from living organisms and were 
considering over twenty thousand gene-related patent applications.‖). 
 52. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2001); John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 286–89 (Wesley M. Cohen 
& Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 
(1998). 
 53. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 698. 
 54. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 719 (2001) (questioning whether such an anticommons 
problem actually exists); see also Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the 
Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and 
Empirical Evidence to Date (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2007), available at  
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?ID=5906 (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (summarizing recent 
empirical studies casting doubt that an anticommons problem exists). 
 55. See also Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An 
Examination of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and 
Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 372 (2004); Kieff, supra note 54, at 727 (stressing that 
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studies on plant biotechnology support such a proposition. For 
example, Pray and Naseem suggest in the their case study of rice 
genomics and plant transformation technologies that the benefits to 
farmers of patents on platform technologies such as transformation 
methods have outweighed the costs of the few possible holdups, by 
stimulating research on these technologies, which have led to major 
increases in efficiency.
56
 Koo and Wright also find that ―the high 
dynamic incentive associated with the privatization of genetic 
innovations can increase dynamic social welfare if it dominates the 
discounted effect of subsequent permanent slowdown in innovation 
[due to private breeders‘ efforts to maximize their profits].‖57 Thus, 
as in other biological fields, it appears that the strong incentives of 
intellectual property protection for plant biotechnology are essential 
to facilitate the further development of plant innovation.  
C. International Legal Norms Concerning Plant Innovation and PGR 
Protection 
As with intellectual property rules generally, the movement 
towards creating international rules relating to the protection of plant 
innovation and PGRs is a relatively recent phenomenon, despite the 
long history of plant innovation dating back to primitive agricultural 
ages.
58
 Initially, efforts toward the establishment of international 
standards on plant innovation and PGRs were motivated by research 
facilitation and conservation.
59
 The former motivation was prompted 
 
commercialization incentives are strongly needed in the biotechnology industry to offset the 
extremely high costs of commercializing biotech products). 
 56. Carl E. Pray & Anwar Naseem, Intellectual Property Rights on Research Tools: 
Incentives or Barriers to Innovation? Case Studies of Rice Genomics and Plant Transformation 
Technologies, 8 AGBIOFORUM 108, 115–16 (2005). 
 57. Koo & Wright, supra note 7, at 29. The authors add that, although ―providers of the 
original genetic resources are naturally anxious to claim part of the windfall from the 
privatization of the chain of innovation initiated by those resources[,] . . . if they achieve their 
compensation by taxing current innovators, the dynamic social benefits of privatization are 
reduced, even though the longer innovation rate might be unaffected.‖ Id. The authors also note 
that it is ―likely that alternative means of compensation could be found that are more efficient.‖ 
Id.  
 58. Carrie P. Smith, Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to 
Globalize Intellectual Property Rights, 26 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 143, 143 (2000); C.S. 
Srinivasan, The International Trends in Plant Variety Protection, 2 eJADE 182, 182 (2005). 
 59. Tilford, supra note 15, at 388. 
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by ―the desire to house the building materials (the genes) in 
international ‗genetic warehouses‘ accessible to all, rather than have 
them haphazardly stored in various jurisdictions throughout the globe 
. . . to facilitate the development of newer and better crops for the 
entire world.‖60 The FAO was animated by this motivation. In 
association with the World Bank and the U.N. Development 
Program, the FAO established in 1971 the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (―CGIAR‖), which was to be the 
―primary caretaker of the international germplasm collections.‖61 In 
2001, after long negotiations over the conservation, sustainable use, 
and benefit-sharing with respect to PGRs for food and agriculture, 
adopted the ITPGRFA.  
The latter motivation reflected an international recognition of the 
need to preserve and sustainably use plant genetic diversity, which 
was being lost due to global industrialization, and to ensure an 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of this diversity.
62
 
This motivation eventually prompted adoption of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (―CBD‖) in 199263 and adoption of the 
associated Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000.
64
 
In addition to the aforementioned international agreements 
designed to facilitate plant research and conservation, increasing 
global trade in plant germplasm stimulated the emergence of 
international norms regarding the protection of plant innovation as 
intellectual property.
65
 These norms are found in the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (―Paris 
Convention‖),66 the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (―UPOV‖),67 and the Agreement on Trade-
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 389. 
 62. Id. at 388–89. 
 63. Supra note 10. 
 64. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 
Jan. 29, 2000, http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. 
 65. See Srinivasan, supra note 58, at 183. 
 66. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 1(2), last revised July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ 
paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 67. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 
33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109 (as amended in 1978 & 1991), available at http://www.upov. 
org/en/publications/conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf [hereinafter 1991 UPOV Act]. The 
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS 
Agreement‖).68 The main objective of the Paris Convention was to 
establish the principle of national treatment and an international 
―right of priority.‖69 Under the ―national treatment‖ principle, each 
country is required to provide foreign nationals treatment no less 
favorable than it grants to its own nationals with respect to industrial 
property.
70
 The international ―right of priority‖ established by the 
Paris Convention specifies that any person who has duly filed an 
application for industrial property in any member country shall be 
entitled to use that filing date as an international priority date for any 
further applications filed in other countries within a given grace 
period.
71
 
While the Paris Convention, as the oldest existing intellectual 
property treaty, provided the first elementary and minimum standards 
for the international protection of ―industrial property,‖ no provision 
of the Convention dealt specifically with plant innovation.
72
 
Nevertheless, the Paris Convention did suggest the possibility of 
 
acronym represents the French-language title of the treaty and its governing organization 
(Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales). 
 68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see Srinivasan, supra note 58, at 183. See generally 
R. Carl Moy, The History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-Interest as an 
Influence, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457 (1993) (evaluating the historical evolution toward 
international intellectual property protection). 
 69. See Moy, supra note 68, at 478–79 (explaining that ―the negotiations [of the Paris 
Convention] began primarily at the insistence of industrial interests‖). 
 70. Paris Convention, supra note 66, art. 2(1) (―Nationals of any country of the Union 
shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the 
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; 
all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this Convention.‖). 
 71. Id. art. 4A(1) (―Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, or for the 
registration of a utility model, or of an industrial design, or of a trademark, in one of the 
countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other 
countries, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter fixed.‖). The right of priority rule 
extends for twelve months for patent and utility models and six months for industrial designs 
and trademarks. Id. art. 4C(1). During this time, any individual who has filed in one member 
country can file in any other without fear of appropriation of their industrial property. 
 72. Id. art. 1(3). Although the Paris Convention established the principle of national 
treatment, an international right of priority, and certain minimum standards for protection 
against unfair competition, the Convention suffers from the lack of a meaningful dispute 
settlement mechanism and the failure to specify minimum standards for industrial property 
rights. See Smith, supra note 58, at 149. 
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intellectual property protection for plant innovation by prohibiting 
technology discrimination.
73
 Article 1(3) of the Paris Convention 
provides: 
Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense 
and shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but 
likewise to agricultural and extractive industries and to all 
manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, 
tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, mineral waters, beer, 
flowers, and flour.
74
 
The UPOV was adopted on December 2, 1961, as a sui generis 
intellectual property rights system to protect the rights of plant 
breeders,
75
 and was the culmination of efforts to provide intellectual 
property protection for agricultural products, including plant 
varieties.
76
 European countries initially led this movement.
77
 Several 
European countries met in Paris in 1957, and again in 1961, to create 
a system recognizing and protecting the legal rights of plant breeders. 
Through these two negotiating conferences, UPOV was eventually 
adopted as an intergovernmental agreement among European 
countries for the protection of plant variety rights. Subsequent to the 
 
 73. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 66, art. 1(3); Charles R. McManis, Taking 
TRIPS on the Information Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and 
Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207, 248 (1996) (―[The language of the Paris 
Convention art. 1(3)], which is clearly designed to eliminate all but specifically enumerated 
subject-matter exclusions from the field of patent law, may eventually enable the United States 
to convince a dispute panel that software inventions cannot be excluded from patent protection 
solely on the ground that software is not patentable subject-matter.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 74. Paris Convention, supra note 66, art. 1(3) (emphasis added).  
 75. See Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime 
Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 111, 123 
(1996) (―The difficulties of obtaining patent protection for the cultivation of plants under 
existing legislation, and the recognition of the extraordinary importance of plant cultivation for 
the agricultural sector and the food industry . . . . led eventually to the adoption of the 
[UPOV].‖). 
 76. Id. at 121–22. 
 77. See id. at 121; J. Benjamin Bai, Note, Protecting Plant Varieties Under TRIPS and 
NAFTA: Should Utility Patents Be Available for Plants?, 32 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 139, 143 (1997) 
(―In 1956, the French Government invited the governments of Western Europe to send 
representatives to a diplomatic conference on the protection of new plant varieties. After four 
years of preparatory work, an international convention was finalized and signed by the member 
states. The UPOV Convention was the result of this conference.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
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adoption of UPOV in 1961, it was amended in 1978 to allow non-
European countries to join.
78
  
UPOV, an offspring of the Paris Convention, is an international 
agreement ―to introduce uniformity in plant variety protection laws 
while allowing for variations in national plant patent legislation.‖79 
Like the Paris Convention, UPOV requires member countries to 
provide ―national treatment‖ and an international ―right of priority.‖80 
Under UPOV, plant breeders can obtain a breeder‘s right for their 
plant variety if it is new (novel),
81
 is clearly distinguishable by one or 
more important characteristics (distinct),
82
 is homogeneous in its 
sexual reproduction or vegetative propagation (uniform),
83
 and is 
stable in its essential characteristics (stable).
84
 
Plant breeders can prevent others, for a limited time, from 
producing or propagating materials of their protected variety without 
their authorization.
85
 Although UPOV provides substantial protection 
 
 78. For a detailed discussion of the history of UPOV, see UPOV, THE FIRST TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES 
OF PLANT (1987). See also Hamilton, supra note 29, at 605–07. 
 79. Tilford, supra note 15, at 406. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 1991 UPOV Act, supra note 67, art. 6, reads as follows: 
The variety shall be deemed to be new if, at the date of filing of the application for a 
breeder‘s right, propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold or 
otherwise disposed of to others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for purposes of 
exploitation of the variety 
(i) in the territory of the Contracting Party in which the application has been filed 
earlier than one year before that date and 
(ii) in a territory other than that of the Contracting Party in which the application has 
been filed earlier than four years or, in the case of trees or of vines, earlier than six 
years before the said date.  
 82. Id. art. 7 (―The variety shall be deemed to be distinct if it is clearly distinguishable 
from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time of the 
filing of the application.‖). 
 83. Id. art. 8 (―The variety shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation that 
may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in its 
relevant characteristics.‖). 
 84. Id. art. 9 (―The variety shall be deemed to be stable if its relevant characteristics 
remain unchanged after repeated propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, 
at the end of each such cycle.‖). 
 85. Id. art. 14(1)(a):  
Subject to Articles 15 and 16, the following acts in respect of the propagating material 
of the protected variety shall require the authorization of the breeder: (i) production or 
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for plant varieties, the scope of its protection prior to 1991 was 
significantly limited because it implicitly allowed both a farmer‘s 
privilege, permitting farmers to reuse or sell the seed from the crops 
they grew in subsequent seasons without paying additional royalties, 
and a breeder‘s exemption, permitting other breeders to use freely the 
protected varieties for research purposes and to commercialize the 
products of that research.
86
 However, the 1991 UPOV Act restricted 
the (optional) farmer‘s privilege to on-farm replanting, barring 
farmers from selling or exchanging seeds with other farmers for 
propagating purposes,
87
 and extended the breeder‘s right to include 
(and thus limited the privilege of other breeders with respect to) 
―essentially derived‖ varieties.88 The 1991 UPOV Act also removed 
 
reproduction (multiplication), (ii) conditioning for the purpose of propagation, (iii) 
offering for sale, (iv) selling or other marketing, (v) exporting, (vi) importing, (vii) 
stocking for any of the purposes mentioned in (i) to (vi), above. 
 86. See Aoki, supra note 4, at 431–32; Smith, supra note 58, at 151. 
 87. 1991 UPOV Act, supra note 67, art. 15(2), states 
(2) [Optional exception] Notwithstanding Article 14, each Contracting Party may, 
within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of 
the breeder, restrict the breeder‘s right in relation to any variety in order to permit 
farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the 
harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected 
variety or a variety covered by Article 14(5)(a)(i) or (ii). 
See also Barry Greengrass, The 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 466, 469–70 (1991). 
 88. 1991 UPOV Act, supra note 67, art. 14(5), states:  
The provisions of paragraphs (1) to (4) shall also apply in relation to (i) varieties which 
are essentially derived from the protected variety, where the protected variety is not 
itself an essentially derived variety, (ii) varieties which are not clearly distinguishable 
in accordance with Article 7 from the protected variety and (iii) varieties whose 
production requires the repeated use of the protected variety. 
 See Aoki, supra note 4, at 432 n.155 (―While the UPOV protects plant breeder‘s [sic] rights 
over ‗essentially derived‘ varieties, the convention itself fails to define what ‗essentially 
derived‘ may entail. It therefore leaves this interpretation to domestic legislation, judicial 
interpretation, or to [sic] private parties in the midst of contractual negotiations.‖). As article 
14(5)(b) makes clear, however, an essentially derived variety must be ―predominantly derived‖ 
from the protected variety. Article 14(5)(c) provides various examples of how essentially 
derived varieties can be obtained—e.g., selection of mutants, somoclonal or individual variants, 
backcrossing or (interestingly) transformations by genetic engineering. The phrase ―essentially 
derived‖ itself suggests that the scope of protection to be provided under UPOV is considerably 
narrower than the scope of protection that copyright law provides for ―derivative works,‖ as 
only those varieties that are ―essentially‖ (i.e., predominantly) derived from the protected 
variety are to be protected under UPOV 1991. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
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the prohibition against double protection of varieties by allowing 
member countries to grant patents for asexually reproduced 
varieties.
89
 Consequently, the 1991 UPOV Act materially 
strengthened breeder‘s rights, even though it did not extend the same 
level of protection afforded by patents. The UPOV currently has 
fifty-four member countries, forty-three of which are parties to the 
1991 UPOV Act.
90
 However, because, like the Paris Convention 
UPOV does not have any enforcement mechanism, its 
implementation depends entirely on the national legislation of each 
member country.
91
 
The TRIPS Agreement was concluded on December 15, 1993, as 
part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
establishing the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖), and was based 
on a recognition of the dual need to ―promote effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures 
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.‖92 It provides 
―universally acknowledged international minimum standards for 
intellectual property protection‖ including protection of copyright 
and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and 
undisclosed but commercially valuable information.
93
 The TRIPS 
Agreement is further distinguished from its predecessors, the Berne 
and Paris Conventions, in that it provides comprehensive minimum 
enforcement standards and contains effective international dispute 
resolution procedures for intellectual property disputes, in addition to 
 
 89. 1991 UPOV Act, supra note 67, art. 35(2)(a), states: 
(2) [Possible exception] (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3(1), any State 
which, at the time of becoming party to this Convention, is a party to the Act of 1978 
and which, as far as varieties reproduced asexually are concerned, provides for 
protection by an industrial property title other than a breeder‘s right shall have the 
right to continue to do so without applying this Convention to those varieties. 
 90. Int‘l Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Members of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.int/en/ 
about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
 91. See Andres A. Gallo & Jay P. Kesan, Property Rights Legislation in Agricultural 
Biotechnology: United States and Argentina, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 565, 574 (2006). 
 92. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, at pmbl., para. 1. 
 93. McManis, supra note 73, at 214; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 1.2. 
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incorporating into TRIPS the minimum substantive standards of the 
Berne and Paris Conventions.
94
 
Initially, the intellectual property rights negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round were ―an attempt by industrialized nations to secure 
multilateral protection for new technologies, pharmaceuticals, and 
copyrighted media works against unauthorized imitation or 
duplication.‖95 However, around 1990, reflecting aggressive global 
marketing and the business of several major biochemical companies 
newly armed with powerful patents, the matter of intellectual 
property protection for biological materials, including plants, had 
become a major issue in the TRIPS negotiations.
96
 Demands of 
developed countries for more expansive intellectual property 
protection of biological materials were accordingly met ―with 
opposition from some developing countries opposed to strengthening 
international patent law; these countries advocated for the exclusion 
from patent of plant or animal varieties if required on particular 
public interest grounds.‖97 Thus, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 
reflects the compromise results of confrontations on intellectual 
property protection of biological materials between developing 
countries and developed countries.
98
 
 
 94. See McManis, supra note 73, at 214–16; Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign 
Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & 
COM. REG. 229, 250 n.53 (1998) (―Although scholars debate the desirability and efficacy of the 
protection regime established under TRIPS, there is no doubt that the intention was to establish 
stricter standards for protection. Hence, some of the vagaries of the Paris and Berne 
Conventions, such as the definition of a patented invention or a trademark, have been clarified 
in TRIPS.‖).  
 95. Aoki, supra note 4, at 436. 
 96. Id. at 436–37 (―Additionally, the phenomenal spate of mergers and acquisitions in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical economic sectors that began in the 1970s continued with these 
companies swiftly moving into the areas of GE plants, plant breeding, and crop development. 
Companies also aggressively acted to secure some form of global intellectual property 
protection for their biotech innovations.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 97. Id. at 437. 
 98. See Charles R. McManis, Patenting Genetic Products and Processes: A TRIPS 
Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 79, 81–82 (F. 
Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (describing the negotiations of the TRIPS as a ―bare-knuckled ‗North-
South‘ confrontation‖). McManis also points out that, with respect to the negotiations of Article 
27, there were some fundamental confrontations among developed countries. Id. at 82 (―[T]he 
debate increasingly became a ‗North-North‘ debate, exposing some fundamental differences 
among the intellectual property regimes of industrialized countries that would have to be 
reconciled if any agreed-upon international minimum standards were to be achieved. The 
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In order to reconcile the conflicts between developing and 
developed countries, as well as conflicts among various developed 
countries, Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a broad 
minimum standard for the subject matter of patent protection, 
defining patentable subject matter as any new invention that involves 
an inventive step and has a potential industrial application.
99
 Article 
27.1 further states that, subject to the transitional provisions 
contained in Articles 65.4, 70.8, and 27.3, ―patents shall be available 
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported 
or locally produced.‖100 
However, exclusions from patentability are somewhat left to the 
mercy of each member country, as Articles 27.2 and 27.3 recognize a 
number possible exceptions. Under Article 27.2, a member country 
may exclude certain subject matter from patentability in order to 
―protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely 
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.‖101 However, 
member countries may exclude an invention from patentability only 
if the commercial exploitation of the invention is not permitted in the 
member country and such a prohibition is actually shown to be 
necessary in order to protect the interests outlined in Article 27.2. 
Additionally, Article 27.3(a) also allows a member country to 
exclude ―diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals.‖102 
Finally, with respect to subject matter exclusion of plants, Article 
27.3(b) squarely states: 
 
specific provisions of Article 27 of TRIPS are as much a product of this ‗North-North‘ debate 
as they are of the larger confrontation between the North and South.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 99. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 27.1, the first sentence of which states that 
―[s]ubject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.‖ 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. art. 27.2. 
 102. Id. art. 27.3(a). 
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Members may also exclude from patentability . . . plants and 
animals other than micro organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes. However, 
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties 
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by 
any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph 
shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement.
103
 
It is important to note that, although Article 27.3(b) allows the 
patentability exclusion for plants and animals other than 
microorganisms, it obliges member countries to provide either patent 
or effective sui generis protection, or any combination of the two, to 
protect plant varieties. Notably, this delicate balance contained in 
Article 27.3(b) essentially echoes a European approach to the 
protection of plant innovation, while the final sentence of Article 
27.3(b), requiring as a ―built-in‖ agenda item that the Article 27.3(b) 
exception be reviewed in 1999, obviously reflects the desire of the 
United States to extend broad patent protect to biotechnological 
inventions generally.
104
 Apparently, under Article 27.3(b), all 
member countries must provide some intellectual property protection 
for plant innovations either by patent, or by an ―effective sui generis 
system,‖ or by a combination of the two methods. While the TRIPS 
Agreement does not expressly define what constitutes an ―effective 
sui generis system,‖ it was arguably intended to refer to the UPOV as 
the model sui generis system.
105
 
 
 103. Id. art. 27.3(b). 
 104. See John Linarelli, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Biotechnology: European Aspects, 6 SING. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 406, 412–13 (2002); McManis, 
supra note 98, at 86; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text. Interestingly, as the recent 
international political circumstances changed, while developed countries now turn into the 
defensive concerning the ―built-in‖ review of Article 27.3(b), calling for a merely 
implementation review of member countries, developing countries increasingly claim to revise 
the text to meet the needs of the developing worlds. McManis, supra note 98, at 93–94. 
 105. See Bai, supra note 77, at 140 (suggesting that the UPOV is a suitable system of 
protection on the international level); Bosselmann, supra note 75, at 125 (―[T]he nations of 
Europe adopted sui generis plant-variety protection schemes under UPOV rather than patent-
based protection schemes.‖); Susan K. Sell, What Role for Humanitarian Intellectual Property? 
The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 203 (2004) 
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In response to the efforts on the part of the industrialized world to 
expand intellectual property rights over plants and their genetic 
components, many developing countries sought to assert sovereign 
rights over PGRs, in the belief that these PGRs might be valuable.
106
 
Most developing countries resist the notion that ―biodiversity should 
[flow freely to industrial countries] while the flow of biological 
products from the industrial countries is patented, expensive, and 
considered the private property of the firms that produce them.‖107 
Consequently, the CBD responded to this concern of developing 
countries by proclaiming the sovereignty of nations over PGRs.
108
 In 
international debates over plant genetic resources, developing 
countries assert that they have sovereign rights over raw genetic 
material, and are entitled to extensive national control over such 
material, including the right to demand compensation or ―benefit-
sharing.‖109  
This sharp conflict between developing and developed countries 
over the ownership and control of PGRs is not likely to be resolved in 
the near future.
110
 However, it is politically difficult for governments 
in the developed world, who vigorously promote the strengthening of 
intellectual property rights in plant innovation, to altogether deny the 
 
(―[T]here really is no consensus on what a sui generis system needs to include. Additionally, the 
negotiations leading to the adoption of Article 27 provide little guidance because they provide 
no record on the meaning of sui generis. American plant breeders have been pushing the UPOV 
as the model sui generis system. American support of UPOV may be due in part to how 
generous UPOV is to the corporate plant breeder.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 106. See Safrin, supra note 48, at 646. 
 107. Id. at 647 (quoting Statement of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1, at 36 (1993)). 
 108. Id.  
 109. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific 
and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 919, 927 
(1996); Safrin, supra note 48, at 648–49. Professor Safrin points out the problems related to the 
sovereign right over genetic material: ―(1) it is creating an anticommons in raw genetic 
material; (2) it threatens the autonomy and liberty of individuals and indigenous communities; 
and (3) it is based on a flawed approach in international law that has led to unenforceable 
regimes destined to increase tensions between nations and threatens to lead to a major TRIPS 
dispute.‖ Id. at 668. 
 110. See Chika B. Onwuekwe, The Commons Concept and Intellectual Property Rights 
Regime: Whither Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge?, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 65, 
88 (2004). 
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rights of developing country governments to control plant genetic 
materials that are housed within their territory.
111
  
With respect to the ongoing international debate over the 
ownership and utilization of PGRs, it is thus necessary to understand 
generally the basic requirements of the CBD, which was adopted at 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
112
 The objectives of the CBD 
are:  
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of 
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and 
by appropriate funding.
113
  
As will become clearer in the third and final Part of this Article, 
contrary to the ITPGRFA, the CBD takes a national-sovereignty 
approach to PGRs, supporting the view that the countries of origin of 
biological resources exercise sovereignty over plants, animals, and 
microorganisms within their national boundaries, rather than the 
―global commons‖ approach of the ITPGRFA with respect to 
selected PGRs.
114
 
With respect to intellectual property protection of PGRs, the 
CBD‘s recognition of intellectual property rights represents a 
compromise between developing and developed countries, as it 
encourages developed countries to support transfers of technology to 
developing countries as a quid pro quo for access to developing 
countries‘ genetic resources.115 CBD Article 16.3 requires each 
 
 111. See id. at 76–77; Safrin, supra note 48, at 662–63. For an economic justification, see 
Koo & Wright, supra note 7. 
 112. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 113. CBD, supra note 10, art. 1. 
 114. See Aoki, supra note 4, at 435. 
 115. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 28 (2004) (―In 
negotiations leading to the CBD‘s adoption in 1992, biodiversity-rich but biotechnology-poor 
developing countries sought financial benefits and technology transfers as incentives to 
conserve rather than exploit the genetic resources within their borders. Biodiversity-poor but 
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contracting party to ―take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures‖ to ensure transfers of technology to developing countries, 
which provide genetic resources, ―including technology protected by 
patents and other intellectual property rights.‖116 Article 16.5 
recognizes that intellectual property rights should be supportive of, 
and not run counter to, the objectives of the CBD.
117
 Although these 
provisions could conceivably be interpreted by developing countries 
as authorizing limitations on intellectual property protection for 
PGRs,
118
 Article 16.2 of the CBD specifies that access to technology 
on concessional and preferential terms will occur only ―where 
mutually agreed,‖119 and explicitly requires that any transfers of 
technology ―be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent 
with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights.‖120  
An associated source of international rules for PGRs and 
biodiversity is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
121
 which was 
adopted by the contracting parties to the CBD on January 29, 2000, 
―to address safety issues involved in the transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms (‗LMOs‘) resulting from modern 
 
biotechnology-rich industrialized states, by contrast, sought to minimize benefits and transfers 
while maximizing access to those resources.‖). 
 116. CBD, supra note 10, art. 16.3. 
 117. Id. art. 16.5. 
 118. See Linarelli, supra note 104, at 425. It was this possibility that caused the United 
States to hesitate in joining the CBD. However, as McManis points out, The United States‘ 
concern is arguably unfounded, as the negotiating history of Article 16.5 makes it clear that this 
provision amounts to little more than an agreement to disagree over whether patents and other 
intellectual property rights would have a beneficial or adverse impact on achieving the 
objectives of the CBD. Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual 
Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 
255, 269 (1998) (―[T]his provision amounts to little more than an agreement to disagree for the 
time being over the precise nature of the interface between international intellectual property 
and environmental protection.‖). However, based upon CBD Article 16.5, some developing 
countries are currently advocating an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement that would require a 
patent applicant to disclose origin of biological material and to give evidence of prior informed 
consent. Kuei-jung Ni, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing 
into TRIPS Regime: An Appraisal of the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic 
Resources, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT‘L HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 433, 446 (2006). 
 119. CBD, supra note 10, art. 16.2 
 120. Id. 
 121. Supra note 64. 
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biotechnology.‖122 Although the Biosafety Protocol recognizes that 
―trade and environmental agreements should be mutually 
supportive,‖123 it may implicate international trade issues, as the 
importation of LMOs into some countries could be refused on the 
basis of speculative and uncertain adverse impacts on the 
environment and health.
124
 At the moment, ―neither treaty law nor 
international trade case law clearly determines whether such trade 
restrictions under the Biosafety Protocol violate WTO principles.‖125 
Indeed, ―the interplay between the Biosafety Protocol and WTO is 
just one of many similar international debates between trade interests 
and environmental concerns.‖126 
D. Plant Innovation Protection in Developing Countries 
The evidence about the socio-economic impact of intellectual 
property protection on plant innovation in developing countries is 
mixed. Early reports asserted that there was little or no evidence 
concerning the direct benefits of introducing intellectual property 
protection systems for plant innovation into developing countries.
127
 
Based on that belief, many developing countries argued that stronger 
intellectual property protection would create an obstacle to economic 
development by blocking technology transfers from developed 
countries.
128
 
Other studies, however, suggest that while intellectual property 
protection for plant innovation might initially impact the economies 
of most developing countries in a negative way, in the long run it 
should stimulate wider economic development and social welfare in 
developing countries. For instance, William Lesser‘s study on the 
 
 122. See Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol and the World 
Trade Organization: Can the Two Coexist?, 12 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 107, 108 (2000). 
 123. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 64, at pmbl., para. 9. 
 124. Gaston & Abate, supra note 122, at 108–09. 
 125. Id. at 109. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Dwijen Rangnekar, Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions 
and Agriculture 14 (Comm‘n on Intell. Prop. Rights, Study Paper No. 3a, 2001). 
 128. See Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the 
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 285 
(2004). 
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effects of intellectual property rights on foreign direct investment and 
imports into developing countries in the post-TRIPS era shows that 
―both imports and FDI are positively and significantly associated 
with the [intellectual property rights] strength index.‖129 An earlier 
study by Robert Evenson, employing an international model for 
policy analysis of agricultural commodities, similarly concluded that 
―[t]he expansion of [intellectual property rights] to plants (and 
animals) should, if properly managed, actually lead to welfare 
improvements for food consumers.‖130 A study by Kesan and Gallo 
suggests that ―a change in legislation providing for plant variety 
protection for seed protection and an increase in enforcement efforts 
in the early 1990s produced an increase in the number of new corn 
varieties registered in Argentina.‖131 Professor Carl Pray et al. 
likewise concluded, after conducting case studies of intellectual 
property rights‘ impact in South Africa, China, Argentina and Brazil, 
that ―if policymakers in developing countries strengthen intellectual 
 
 129. W. Lesser, The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investment 
and Imports into Developing Countries in the Post TRIPs Era, 5 IP STRATEGY TODAY 1, 2 
(2002) (―A one point rise in the IPR score (about 10%) is associated with a $1.5 billion increase 
in FDI (50% of the median amount) and an $8.9 billion increase in imports (40% of the 
median).‖). 
 130. R. E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights, Access to Plant Germplasm, and Crop 
Production Scenarios in 2020, 39 CROP SCI. 1630, 1635 (1999). Professor Evenson evaluates 
global equilibriums in real prices by using the International Model for Policy Analysis of 
Agricultural Commodities developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute, which 
covers seventeen commodities and thirty-five countries and regions. Id. at 1632. Evenson 
explores two policy scenarios, the first involving an expansion of intellectual property rights in 
developed countries, but not in developing countries, the second involving a temporary block in 
the international exchange of genetic resources. Id. at 1635. He concludes that the first policy 
scenario will have ―deleterious effects on the welfare of consumers in developing countries and 
relatively minor effects on consumers in developed countries.‖ Id. The second policy scenario 
will have even ―more serious welfare implications than the first because many of the poorest 
developing countries are dependent on international exchange of plant genetic resources.‖ Id. 
However, Evenson also notes that a shift ―to a regime with strong [intellectual property rights] 
protection could . . . have serious implications for developing countries,‖ for while developed 
countries have the experience and institutions to enable this transition, developing countries 
generally do not. Id. On the other hand, Evenson concludes that ―[n]either scenario need obtain 
if policy makers understand the importance of maintaining systems of genetic resource 
exchange.‖ Id.  
 131. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Property Rights and Incentives to Invest in Seed 
Varieties: Governmental Regulations in Argentina, 8 AGBIOFORUM 118, 124 (2005). This 
contrasts with the effects on ―soybean varieties, which need stricter property protection than 
currently available in Argentina, did not experience a strong increase in the number of new 
varieties.‖ Id. 
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property rights and allow the use of plant biotechnology, small 
farmers and consumers could increase their incomes.‖132 
Despite some promising evidence that stronger intellectual 
property protection for plant innovation, if properly organized and 
administered, could increase economic growth and encourage 
technological development, many developing countries have been 
hesitant to adopt a full-fledged intellectual property system because 
of their limited ability to establish and manage such a system.
133
 With 
respect to intellectual property protection for plant innovation, while 
the TRIPS Agreement mandates that developing countries provide 
some form of effective protection for plant varieties, it also gives 
them flexibility in designing the optimal protection system to meet 
their own particular needs and circumstances. The TRIPS Agreement 
expressly recognizes that member countries may, ―in formulating or 
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary . . . to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development.‖134 In addition, as 
we have seen, Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement gives 
members broad discretion in fashioning a domestic system of plant 
variety protection. 
 
 132. CARL E. PRAY ET AL., THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF PRIVATE SECTOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 2, 9–16, 22–
23 (2001). For other studies addressing the potential impact of strengthened intellectual 
property rights on developing countries, see Stanley P. Kowalski & R. David Kryder, Golden 
Rice: A Case Study in Intellectual Property Management and International Capacity Building, 
13 RISK 47, 67 (2002) (―[O]ver the longer term, increased international harmonization of 
[intellectual property] laws and management might serve to ameliorate many . . . risks, and 
hence facilitate the sustained transfer of Golden Rice as well as future advances in agri-
biotech.‖); Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An 
Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 472 (2001). (―[T]he short-run impacts of 
TRIPS will be to redistribute income between countries, with most gains accruing to the United 
States and other technology developers. Moreover, intellectual property protection will generate 
additional market power that could harm information users. Over the longer term, however, 
there are channels through which technical change and growth in the technology importing 
countries could be improved.); Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for 
Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 544 (1997) (―Once adequately financed public 
administration and politically supported high-performance judicial remedies are in place, it can 
be expected that developing countries will experience the solid economic benefits which flow 
from robust protection for intellectual property.‖). 
 133. See Kowalski & Kryder, supra note 132, at 65; Nelson, supra note 29, at 1009. 
 134. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 8.1. Article 8, however, contains a proviso that 
these measures must be ―consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.‖ Id. 
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Given the foregoing flexibilities in TRIPS, many developing 
nations have attempted to craft domestic laws that reflect their own 
perceived needs. For example, in 2001, India adopted the Protection 
of Plant Variety and Farmers‘ Rights Act, adopting a sui generis 
system for plant innovation protection that recognizes the 
contribution of both commercial plant breeders and farmers, although 
India has thus far not joined UPOV.
135
 India‘s sui generis law 
contains provisions recognizing a broad farmer‘s privilege and 
benefit-sharing for local communities, as well as requiring applicants 
to provide information about the origin of the genetic material used. 
It is questionable whether the Act will constitute an ―effective‖ sui 
generis system under the TRIPS Agreement, as it overtly favors the 
interests of farmers over plant breeder‘s rights.136  
China also enacted Regulations on the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (Council Regulations) in 1997 in order to satisfy 
its obligation under the TRIPS Agreement, immediately after joining 
the WTO, and ratified the UPOV 1978 Act in 1999.
137
 Nonetheless, 
the protection of plant varieties under the Council Regulations is 
limited to certain designated plant varieties, and the term of 
protection for most plant varieties is only fifteen years. Thus, the 
 
 135. See Nelson, supra note 29, at 1010–11; Brush, supra note 33, at 93–95. 
 136. See Nelson, supra note 29, at 1011; Brush, supra note 33, at 94–95. Besides the 
enactment of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers‘ Rights Act, India amended its 
Patent Act three times, most recently in January 2005, in order to fulfill its obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement; yet it is still not certain that the Act is TRIPS-compliant, as the Act still 
precludes the patentability of plants and methods of agriculture or horticulture. Nelson, supra, 
at 1010. 
 137. Nelson, supra note 29, at 1011–12. China‘s accession to the UPOV 1978 Act appears 
to derive from an unwillingness to comply with the more demanding obligations of the UPOV 
1991 Act. See Lester Ross & Libin Zhang, Agricultural Development and Intellectual Property 
Protection for Plant Varieties: China Joins the UPOV, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 226, 240 
(1999). However, it is unclear how China was eligible for the accession to the UPOV 1978 Act 
rather than the UPOV 1991, as Article 37 of the UPOV 1991 does not allow a deposit of 
instrument of accession to the Act of 1978, either after the entry into force of the 1991 UPOV 
Act or after December 31, 1995, for developing countries. See UPOV, supra note 67, art. 37; 
Press Release, China Accedes to UPOV (Mar. 23, 1999), http://www.upov.int/en/news/ 
pressroom/36.htm. However, China did not receive special treatment, as many developing 
countries were apparently allowed to adhere to the 1978 UPOV between 1995 and 1999. See 
Int‘l Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 90.  
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protection of plant varieties in China appears to be weaker than in the 
United States or Europe.
138
  
II. THE INTERFACE OF OPEN SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY 
PROTECTION IN THE ITPGRFA 
A. An Overview of the ITPGRFA 
The ITPGRFA was adopted by the FAO conference on November 
3, 2001, stating its objectives to be ―the conservation and sustainable 
use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in 
harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable 
agriculture and food security.‖139 Notwithstanding the reference to 
the CBD, however, it bears emphasizing that the ITPGRFA 
represents a marked departure from the approach of the CBD. 
Whereas the CBD represents an assertion of national sovereign 
ownership of biological diversity generally, and thus apparently 
envisages a series of bilateral negotiations over access to such 
diversity and benefit-sharing, the ITPGRFA represents a waiver of 
those sovereign rights with respect to the sixty-four food and feed 
crops that are included in the ITPGRFA‘s ―Multilateral System,‖ 
which creates a form of ―limited common property‖ in crops that 
―account for the bulk of human nutrition.‖140 
As we have seen, the expansion of intellectual property protection 
standards in the plant biotechnology field ultimately engendered 
disputes between developing countries and developed countries over 
ownership rules for PGRs.
141
 In the early 1980s, developing countries 
that had initially regarded PGRs as ―common heritage‖ began to 
press international institutes such as the FAO ―to staunch the flow of 
PGRs from centers of biodiversity in the developing world to plant 
 
 138. Nelson, supra note 29, at 1012–13. 
 139. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 1. 
 140. See Laurence R. Helfer, Using Intellectual Property Rights to Preserve the Global 
Genetic Commons: The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 217, 219–20 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman eds., 2005). 
 141. Id. at 217. 
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breeding industries in industrialized nations.‖142 They also raised 
compensation claims against commercial plant breeders who used 
their PGRs as raw material for developing new plant innovations.
143
 
These arguments were made in response to the FAO‘s 1983 
adoption of a non-binding declaration known as the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (―Undertaking‖), which 
stated that all PGRs are part of the ―heritage of mankind and 
consequently should be available without restriction‖ for scientific 
research, plant breeding, and conservation.
144
 By the early 1990s, 
although developing countries had successfully incorporated their 
most critical priorities—recognition of farmers‘ rights, national 
sovereignty, and a prohibition on intellectual property rights for 
germplasm held in international seed banks—in a revision of the 
Undertaking, they still felt the need ―to create legally binding rules to 
address these issues more conclusively‖ because ―those rules were 
reflected only in soft law declarations that were normatively 
underdeveloped or contested by many industrialized states.‖145 
Through extended and difficult negotiations over seven years, the 
ITPGRFA was eventually adopted in November 2001.
146
 This treaty 
creates a Multilateral System, a form of ―limited common property,‖ 
which is designed to facilitate access by member countries and their 
nationals to germplasm of sixty-four staple crops held in government 
and international seed banks for research, breeding, and crop 
development purposes.
147
 Under this system, private parties who 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 217–18. 
 144. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources art. 1, Nov. 23, 1983, ftp://ftp. 
fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu/iutextE.pdf; see also Helfer, supra note 140, at 218. 
 145. Helfer, supra note 115, at 35–39, 39 (describing the adoption of the ITPGRFA as a 
result of forum-shifting by developing countries, led by Mexico and aided NGOs). In response 
to developed countries‘ claim that the Undertaking created a conflict with the UPOV, which 
protected breeders‘ rights, the Undertaking was also revised to include a statement that the 
UPOV‘s protection of breeders‘ rights was ―not incompatible‖ with the common heritage 
principle. Id. at 36. 
 146. See Ronan Kennedy, International Conflicts over Plant Genetic Resources: Future 
Developments?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 26 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 27 (―This creation is, to a certain extent, a reversal of the process of 
propertization that brought the CBD into being, caused perhaps by the prohibitive cost of 
segregating seeds and tracing samples to those working on core crops for the poor, and 
therefore, the most important PGRs were essentially placed back in the public domain.‖); 
Helfer, supra note 115, at 40; ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 10.2 (―In the exercise of their 
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develop commercial products using genetic materials from the 
Multilateral System must accept a Material Transfer Agreement 
(―MTA‖), the terms of which were adopted by the Governing Body 
of the ITPGRFA in 2006, and then obligatorily pay ―an equitable 
share of the benefits‖ to a fund to be used to promote conservation 
and sustainable use of germplasm when the product has restrictions 
on its availability to others for further research and breeding, and they 
are encouraged to pay voluntarily when the product is available 
without restriction for such purposes.
148
  
A further critical restriction on recipients of germplasm from the 
Multilateral System is the provision in article 12.3(d) that 
―[r]ecipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights 
that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form 
received from the Multilateral System.‖149 The wording of this 
 
sovereign rights, the Contracting Parties agree to establish a multilateral system, which is 
efficient, effective, and transparent, both to facilitate access to plant genetic resources . . . , and 
to share . . . the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, on a complementary and 
mutually reinforcing basis.‖). 
 148. See Helfer, supra note 140, at 220 n.15; see also ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 
13.2(d)(ii). Article 13.2(d)(ii) states: 
The Contracting Parties agree that the standard Material Transfer Agreement referred 
to in Article 12.4 shall include a requirement that a recipient who commercializes a 
product that is a plant genetic resource for food and agriculture and that incorporates 
material accessed from the Multilateral System, shall pay to the mechanism referred to 
in Article 19.3f, an equitable share of the benefits arising from the commercialization 
of that product, except whenever such a product is available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding, in which case the recipient who 
commercializes shall be encouraged to make such payment. 
 The Governing Body shall, at its first meeting, determine the level, form and manner 
of the payment, in line with commercial practice. The Governing Body may decide to 
establish different levels of payment for various categories of recipients who 
commercialize such products; it may also decide on the need to exempt from such 
payments small farmers in developing countries and in countries with economies in 
transition. The Governing Body may, from time to time, review the levels of payment 
with a view to achieving fair and equitable sharing of benefits, and it may also assess, 
within a period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty, whether the 
mandatory payment requirement in the MTA shall apply also in cases where such 
commercialized products are available without restriction to others for further research 
and breeding. 
 149. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(d). Article 12.3(d) is a compromise between 
developing countries and developed countries over ―whether to bar patenting of isolated and 
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provision was the most controversial part of the negotiations over the 
ITPGRFA, as developing countries insisted on a prohibition against 
intellectual property or other rights, not only for PGRs as such, but 
also for ―their genetic parts and components,‖ while developed 
countries insisted that the ban merely limit assertion of intellectual 
property rights in PGRs ―in the form received‖ from the Multilateral 
System.
150
  
In addition, although the ITPGRFA reaffirms a commitment to 
farmers‘ rights, recognizing the contributions that local farming and 
indigenous communities have made, and will continue to make, to the 
conservation and development of PGRs,
151
 this provision is described 
as ―merely a symbolic expression of gratitude,‖ without offering any 
effective implementation tool for those rights at the international 
level.
152
 The practical implementation of farmers‘ rights—defined in 
the treaty as including the right to participate in decision-making and 
benefit-sharing, as well as the right to protect traditional 
knowledge—explicitly remains within the sole discretion of national 
governments.
153
 Thus, although the ITPGRFA offers a more 
 
purified genes extracted from seeds placed in the common seed pool.‖ Helfer, supra note 140, 
at 220–21. 
 150. See Gregory Rose, International Law of Sustainable Agriculture in the 21st Century: 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 15 GEO. INT‘L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 620–21 (2003). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 
222–27. 
 151. See Aoki, supra note 4, at 441; Rose, supra note 150, at 622–24; see also ITPGRFA, 
supra note 10, art. 9.1. 
The Contracting Parties recognize the enormous contribution that the local and 
indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in 
the centres of origin and crop diversity, have made and will continue to make for the 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources which constitute the basis of 
food and agriculture production throughout the world. 
Id. 
 152. Rose, supra note 150, at 622, 622–24 (analyzing the negotiation history over farmers‘ 
right between the South and the North). 
 153. See ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 9.2. Article 9.2 states: 
The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realizing Farmers‘ Rights, as 
they relate to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, rests with national 
governments. In accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party 
should, as appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect 
and promote Farmers‘ Rights including: 
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comprehensive definition of farmers‘ rights than the earlier 
Undertaking, it does nothing to advance the argument of proponents 
that farmers‘ rights should be recognized as a property right.154 
At the same time, however, the ITPGRFA does represent an 
unprecedented international effort to combine an open source system 
of facilitated access to PGRs with a mandatory system of benefit-
sharing, including mandatory sharing of monetary and other benefits 
arising out of commercialization of certain patent-protected plant 
innovation. To get a sense of whether a kind of ―Bio-Linux‖155 can in 
fact be created under the auspices of the ITPGRFA, it will be useful 
to compare the characteristics of the Multilateral System under the 
ITPGRFA with open source approaches in other intellectual property 
fields. 
B. The Free & Open Source Software Movement(s) 
Free or open source software (―F/OSS‖) refers to computer 
software, the source code of which is made available to the public 
under a free or open source copyright license that permits members 
of the public ―to use, change, and improve the software, and to 
 
 (a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture: 
 (b) The right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and 
 (c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters 
related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture. 
Id. Article 9.3 states: ―Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers 
have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national 
law and as appropriate.‖ Id. art. 9.3. 
 154. See Rose, supra note 150, at 625. 
 155. Professor Aoki uses the term ―Bio-Linux‖ as a symbolic term representing an open 
source licensing scheme in the biotechnological field and asserts that an open source licensing 
scheme such as the General Public License for open source software should be introduced in 
order to safeguard the public PGRs from privatization. See Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic, 
supra note 3, at 798–99. ―BioLinux‖ is ―a term used in a variety of projects involved in making 
access to bioinformatics software on a Linux platform easier using one or more of [a variety of] 
methods.‖ Wikipedia, BioLinux, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BioLinux (last visited Apr. 20, 
2009). For recent, book-length examinations of this topic, see AOKI, SEED WARS, supra note 3; 
JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (2008). 
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redistribute it in modified or unmodified form.‖156 A computer 
program is typically comprised of both ―source code‖ and ―object 
code.‖ A programmer first writes a series of commands in a ―human 
readable‖ programming language, known as source code, and then 
uses a software tool such as a compiler to transform this ―source 
code‖ into a machine-readable language expressed in a binary format, 
the so-called ―object code‖ version of the program.157 In most cases, 
commercial software is sold without disclosing the source code, 
which is withheld as a carefully guarded trade secret, and the license 
accompanying the product merely provides a limited right to use the 
product, and little or no right to make or distribute derivative works, 
thus preventing users from modifying the software, and also 
preventing competitors from engaging in reverse-engineering.
158
 In 
contrast, open source software is distributed without such restrictions; 
both the object code version and the source code version of a 
program are provided under a free or open source license.
159
 
In recent years, the F/OSS movement has moved beyond the 
realm of the hobbyist and scientific communities, in which software 
developers shared their source code so that anyone could ―freely view 
and modify the program.‖160 The rise of the Internet facilitated 
widespread proliferation of open source projects by reducing the 
transaction costs of collaboration around the globe.
161
 In 1985, 
Richard Stallman institutionalized the F/OSS movement by 
establishing the Free Software Foundation (―FSF‖) to encourage 
software development based on free modification and free 
distribution of source code.
162
 The FSF sets forth the Free Software 
Definition, which determines whether a license is a free software 
 
 156. See Wikipedia, Open-source Software, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source_ 
software (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 157. See RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK 87–88, 92–93 (8th ed. 2006). 
 158. See Joseph Eng, Jr., From Software to Life Sciences: The Spreading of the Open 
Source Production to New Technological Areas, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 419, 422 
(2005). 
 159. Id.  
 160. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open 
Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 182–85 
(1999). 
 161. Id. at 183. 
 162. Id.  
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license. The Free Software Definition is largely comprised of four 
freedoms: ―[t]he freedom to run the program, for any purpose‖; ―[t]he 
freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your 
needs‖; ―[t]he freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your 
neighbor‖; and ―[t]he freedom to improve the program, and release 
your improvements (and modified versions in general) to the public, 
so that the whole community benefits.‖163  
The term ―open source‖ was first suggested and adopted in 1998 
by the Open Source Initiative (―OSI‖), which was founded by Bruce 
Perens and Eric S. Raymond to release the source code of their 
popular Web browser, Netscape, as open source software.
164
 The OSI 
also adopted the Open Source Definition as a means of determining 
whether programs qualify as open source software. The Open Source 
Definition requires free redistribution, availability of the source code, 
permission to make derivative works, integrity of the author‘s source 
code, no restrictions on accompanying software, neutrality with 
respect to technology, and forbids discrimination against persons, 
groups, or fields of endeavor.
165
 The Open Source Definition was also 
designed to make the principles of F/OSS more compatible with 
proprietary software. Contrary to the Free Software Definition, the 
Open Source Software Definition permits the licensee to combine the 
free source code with proprietary software.
166
 As a result, the Open 
Source Definition is considered to be more compatible with 
commercial interests than the Free Software Definition, as it 
generally allows the interface of open source software and 
proprietary software. 
The F/OSS movement operates in conformity with, and is 
dependent upon, the existing intellectual property rights regime. 
Notably, most participants in the F/OSS movement use ―copyright 
 
 163. Free Software Foundation, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/free-sw.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). However, these four freedoms are subject 
to an important constraint. See infra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 164. Open Source Initiative, History of the OSI, http://www.opensource.org/history (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 165. Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition (Annotated), http://www.open 
source.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 166. See José J. González de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and 
Contractual Issues, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 182–84 (2007). 
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ownership and contracts to enforce social norms of sharing and 
openness.‖167 Unlike proprietary software, in which copyright is used 
―to exclude,‖ however, copyright in F/OSS is used to confer a right 
―to distribute.‖168 Open source software is distributed under a license 
ensuring that source code will remain freely available to the public 
for further modification and redistribution. Over the past decade, a 
variety of open source licenses have been proposed. These licenses 
can be broadly classified into two types: the viral (or ―free‖) software 
license and the non-viral (or ―open source‖) license.169  
The GNU General Public License (―GPL‖), which was developed 
by the FSF, is the most famous example of the viral license. Under 
the GPL, both the original source code and that of any derivative 
works based on same must be released to the public even when the 
software has been modified and redistributed by subsequent 
programmers; downstream licensees cannot make derivative software 
proprietary.
170
 Therefore, under the ―viral‖ aspect of the GPL, if a 
company uses software operating under the GPL with a proprietary 
product that it has developed, the company must distribute the source 
code of the entire product without charge to the public.
171
  
On the other hand, the non-viral license allows the licensee ―to 
modify the source code without requiring [him] to redistribute the 
modified software under the same licensing terms.‖172 The Berkeley 
Software Distribution License (―BSD License‖) is one of the most 
popular non-viral licenses.
173
 The BSD License is considered to be 
the least restrictive of the open source licenses. Contrary to the GPL, 
BSD allows the licensee to combine the source code with proprietary 
 
 167. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 199 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
 168. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 1 (2004). 
 169. See Adam Kubelka & Matthew Fawcett, No Free Beer—Practice Tips for Open 
Source Licensing, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 797, 812, 812 n.52 (2006). 
 170. See FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE (2007), http:// 
www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html. 
 171. See id. (―You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone 
who comes into possession of a copy. this License will therefore apply . . . to the whole work, 
and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged.‖). 
 172. Jyh-An Lee, Note, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy 
Implications of Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 52 (2006). 
 173. See Kubelka & Fawcett, supra note 169, at 812–13. 
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software because its derivatives can be released under a proprietary 
license.
174
  
Compared to commercial proprietary software, F/OSS has some 
distinct advantages. First, open source software offers the human-
readable source code as well as the machine-readable object code, 
thus opening the program to the critical scrutiny of users, whereas 
proprietary software is generally sold only in its object code form. 
Second, an open source license gives a licensee broad rights, 
―granting the licensee the ability to freely copy, distribute and modify 
the software,‖ whereas a proprietary license normally restricts a 
licensee‘s ability to use the software for such purposes.175 Third, 
―open source software is usually licensed free of charge, whereas 
proprietary software is almost always licensed for a license fee.‖176 
Due to these benefits, the open source software movement has gained 
widespread acceptance as a viable collaborative innovation and 
distribution model, and has recently begun to compete successfully 
with proprietary software in a number of commercial areas. A 2003 
report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
presented evidence that the F/OSS process produces better software, 
and thus offers a viable mode of software production, particularly in 
developing countries.
177
 The Linux operating system, Apache web 
server, and Firefox Internet browser are all well-known examples of 
successes in the open source software movement.
178
 
 
 174. See Natasha T. Horne, Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to 
Encourage Free Use, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 863, 879–80 (2001). 
 175. Peter Brown, Legal Issues in the Open Source Community, PATS., CPYRTS., TMS. & 
LIT. PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (Practicing Law Inst., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2004, at 
309, 317. 
 176. Id. 
 177. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003, E-Commerce and 
Development Report 2003, at 95–96, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SIDTE/ECB/2003/1. For 
discussions of the growing acceptance of open-source innovation and its successful competition 
with proprietary innovation in many commercial areas, see generally David W. Opderbeck, The 
Penguin‟s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 
(2004); Eng, Jr., supra note 158. 
 178. See Eng, Jr., supra note 158, at 419–20. 
[I]n the web server market, the open source program known as ―Apache‖ has captured 
approximately 70% of the web server market share as of January 2005, and continues 
to gain market share at the expense of all other competitors, including those that 
produce proprietary software. In the operating system market, the open source 
software known as ―Linux‖ has made spectacular gains in market share over a short 
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C. Open Source Innovation in Biotechnology 
The success of the open source software movement has 
engendered growing interest in the use of open source licensing to 
distribute creative works and scientific research results in other 
technological fields.
179
 This has been particularly true in the field of 
biotechnology. 
Tim Hubbard of the British Sanger Institute first attempted to 
implement an open source scheme in biotechnology in an effort to 
foster the exchange of research information and the transfer of 
technology among human genome researchers.
180
 However, 
Hubbard‘s attempt failed to produce meaningful fruit because the 
Sanger Institute ultimately released all of its human genome research 
materials into the public domain.
181
 Indeed, the Human Genome 
Project (―HGP‖)182 freely released all of its data on the Internet under 
a traditional public domain model, allowing the public to use the data 
without any restriction.
183
 Critics complained that ―this public domain 
model would permit commercial users to diminish the utility and 
accessibility of the HGP‘s public domain data by making proprietary 
their improvements to that data,‖184 and that criticism influenced 
subsequent efforts to create open biotechnology projects.
185
  
 
time. As of June 2001, Linux was running on approximately 30% of the machines 
connected to the web, up from a mere 0.1% as of May 1999. Furthermore, the open 
source internet browser known as Firefox, though currently possessing less than 10% 
of the browser market, appears to be rapidly eroding the market dominance of 
Microsoft‘s Internet Explorer. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 179. See Andrés Guadamuz González, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in Scientific 
Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 321 (2006); see also AOKI, SEED WARS, supra note 3, at 
109–22; HOPE, supra note 155. 
 180. See González, supra note 179, at 336. 
 181. See id. 
 182. The Human Genome Project (HGP) is the worldwide project to identify and sequence 
the human genome, led by the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium and 
private companies such as Celera Genomics. See generally Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, 
Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK 97 (1994). 
 183. Donna M. Gitter, Resolving the Open Source Paradox in Biotechnology: A Proposal 
for a Revised Open Source Policy for Publicly Funded Genomic Databases, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
1475, 1478 (2007). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1478–79. 
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For example, the International HapMap Project was launched in 
October 2002 as a consortium among scientists in Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, China, Nigeria, and the United States to ―develop 
a haplotype map of the human genome, . . . which will describe the 
common patterns of human DNA sequence variation.‖186 The 
haplotype map ―is expected to be a key resource for researchers to 
use to find genes affecting health, disease, and responses to drugs and 
environmental factors.‖187 With respect to the data generated, 
individual genotype data was initially made available under a 
temporary policy of minimal restraints, whereby users had to ―agree 
to not reduce others‘ access to the data, and to share the data only 
with others who have made the same agreement,‖ in order to ensure 
that Project data remained in the public domain.
188
 Once the data 
became dense enough to define regions of strong association, all of 
the data was to be released into the public domain without 
restrictions.
189
 In December 2004, the license was dropped and the 
HapMap Project released its full project results into the public 
domain, so that any researcher could use the information.
190
 
A more overtly open source approach to biotechnology was 
undertaken in 2005 by the Center for the Application of Molecular 
 
 186. See International HapMap Project, About the International HapMap Project, 
http://www.hapmap.org/abouthapmap.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2000). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; see also Gitter, supra note 183, at 1482–83. 
In order to make certain that the HapMap data would remain accessible to all users, the 
HapMap Project explained at the outset that it ―had to adopt a Data Release Policy 
where some data are released quickly without restriction and some data are released 
with restrictions for a limited period of time.‖ Thus, the HapMap Project implemented 
―a free, non-exclusive, non-royalty-bearing licensing agreement to obtain access to 
certain types of data the project had collected on individuals‘ DNA sequences, 
specifically the genotypes.‖ 
Id. (citations omitted). Noting a significant shortcoming of the open source approach used by 
the HapMap Project, namely that it is inadequate to prevent the dangers of parasitic patenting, 
Professor Gitter proposes an alternative open source framework, which relies on the doctrine of 
trade secrecy, for future publicly funded genomic databases. Id. at 1519–20. 
 189. See International HapMap Project, supra note 186. 
 190. The Int‘l HapMap Consortium, A Haplotype Map of the Human Genome, 437 NATURE 
1299, 1317 (2005); see also Gitter, supra note 183, at 1485 (―Indeed, on December 10, 2004, 
the International HapMap Consortium announced that it would end its licensing policy, with the 
result that all the consortium‘s data would from that time forth be available to the public 
without restriction.‖). 
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Biology to International Agriculture (―CAMBIA‖).191 In 2005, 
CAMBIA developed three different strains of bacteria that could be 
substituted for the traditional method of introducing genetic material 
into plants, and decided to use this technology as a starting point to 
generate a protected commons for researchers in the life sciences, 
which became known as Biological Innovation for Open Source 
(―BIOS‖).192 CAMBIA gives free access to its discoveries, but 
subject to a GPL-style license analogous to that used in the F/OSS 
movement, requiring anyone using the technology to contribute 
improvements to the core toolkit of others who have agreed to the 
same terms.
193
 The BIOS license requires licensees who want to use 
the BIOS technologies to give other participants in the BIOS 
initiative ―a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, fully paid-up 
license‖ to any improvements they might make, even though they are 
permitted to patent and license such improvements.
194
 It is as yet 
unclear, however, whether this BIOS license will be compatible with 
existing intellectual property systems, and whether it will be adequate 
to prevent the dangers of parasitic patenting by commercial users.
195
 
 
 191. CAMBIA is ―an independent, international non-profit institute‖ in Australia that aims 
to develop new technologies, tools and paradigms to foster collaboration and life-sciences 
enabled innovation, in order to enable disadvantaged communities and developing countries to 
meet their own challenges in food security, health, and natural resource management. Center for 
the Application of Molecular Biology to International Agriculture, CAMBIA Homepage, http:// 
www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 192. Eng, Jr., supra note 158, at 429–30. 
 193. See id. at 430–31; Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to 
Address the Access & Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 271, 
303–04 (2007). 
 194. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 193, at 304–06. 
 195. See Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 
6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 167 (2004) (noting that ―[t]he restrictions necessary to maintain 
the open source nature of such projects may implicate the doctrine of patent misuse in that they 
appear to use the power of the patent grant to affect inventions beyond the teachings of the 
original patent,‖ but concluding that under a proper analysis of whether the patent holder‘s 
―behavior impermissibly extends the scope of the patent grant,‖ either because the effects of the 
behavior are inconsistent with patent policy or because the effects run afoul of the antitrust rule 
of reason, open source biotechnology projects should not constitute patent misuse); see also 
González, supra note 179, at 356–57, 357 (―The potential incompatibility between patents and 
open source licenses is difficult to resolve.‖); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health 
Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1031, 1072 (2005) (―BIOS, like the HGP and HapMap Projects, is betting that certain research 
tools are shareable, even in wealthy markets and under current IP regimes, because the tools‘ 
research value is greatest if they are freely accessible.‖). 
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Additional examples of groups that take an open source approach 
in biotechnology include the Universities Allied for Essential 
Medicines (―UAEM‖) and the Tropical Disease Initiative (―TDI‖).196 
The UAEM is a nationwide, student-run organization in the United 
States that exists for the purpose of encouraging universities to 
reserve rights to improve access to essential medicines in the 
developing world.
197
 It seeks to use the rights owned by universities 
to create a ―self-binding commons,‖ analogous to the open source 
movement, by granting a non-exclusive license to third parties to 
provide the approved drug to developing or least developed 
countries.
198
 Stephen Maurer, Arti Rai, and Andrej Sali have recently 
proposed the creation of the TDI as an open source production model 
in which scientists could work together on early-stage development 
of drugs to fight tropical diseases.
199
 Scientists would be required to 
post their research results on an online database when they identify 
new drug candidates, and this will serve to coordinate research for the 
development of new drugs.
200
 
Notwithstanding these attempts to adopt an open source approach 
to biotechnology, because this movement is still in its infancy, it is 
unclear whether the open source principles developed in the software 
arena will successfully migrate to the field of biotechnology. Some 
commentators argue that biotechnology is not a good candidate for 
the open source model of innovation for a variety of reasons. For 
example, David Opderdeck reaches such a conclusion through his 
 
 The enforceability of open-source licenses received an important boost in the United States 
with the decision of the Court of Appeals in Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382–1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), which held that the terms of an open source artistic license are enforceable 
copyright conditions, and that the licensor would thus be entitled to pursue preliminary 
injunctive relief under the Copyright Act of 1976.  
 196. In addition to these examples, bioinformatics might be one area of open source 
biotechnology. Bioinformatics, the application of information technology to solve biological 
problems, began to use open source software as a favored tool. ―Nevertheless, the relative 
success of bioinformatics has more to do with the success of open source software than with the 
application of open biotechnology.‖ González, supra note 179, at 337. 
 197. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 193, at 296. 
 198. Id. at 296–97. 
 199. See Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source 
an Answer?, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS FROM ITS HEARTLAND 33, 33–36 (Lynn Yarris ed., 
2004), available at http://www.bayeconfor.org/pdf/BioTechReport.pdf. 
 200. Id. at 33.  
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analysis of various characteristics of biotechnology, based upon a 
theory of Yochai Benkler, who posits three layers of communication 
in open source software development—namely, ―the ‗physical‘ layer 
across which information travels, the ‗code‘ layer that makes the 
physical layer run, and the ‗content‘ layer of information.‖201 First of 
all, says Opderdeck, the physical layers in biotechnology are 
fundamentally different than those of computer software because ―the 
hardware layer typically is organic and the interaction between the 
hardware and code layers often is highly specialized and complex.‖202 
The biological code layers, which are composed of genetic codes, are 
also more complex than computer code, as they ―cannot be created by 
simply typing on a keyboard.‖203 Finally, the content layer, which is a 
particular function (e.g., an enzyme) performed by the specific 
genetic code, ―is not highly granular‖ because the synthesis of the 
enzyme would require more specialized equipment, techniques and 
materials.
204
 In addition, with regard to the social-psychological 
rewards that will attract collaborators, Opderbeck asserts that 
biotechnology research calls for stronger compensation (e.g., 
intellectual property protection) than the peer-reviewed reputations 
applied to software development, since, while computer software can 
be developed in a garage with a handful of cheap, readily available 
tools, biotechnology development demands a significant amount of 
expensive equipment and materials.
205
  
Similarly, Joseph Eng, Jr., contends that ―the inability [of 
biotechnology researchers] to externalize [the cost of scarce 
resources] will be enough to prevent contributions from even the 
most motivated would-be contributor,‖ while a computer programmer 
can usually absorb the cost of open source software development 
himself because the cost is relatively minimal.
206
 By contrast, most 
biotechnology researchers will have to externalize at least some of 
 
 201. See Opderbeck, supra note 177, at 181–85 (quoting Yochai Benkler, From Consumers 
to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User 
Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562–63 (2000)). 
 202. Id. at 183. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 185. 
 205. Id. at 195–96. 
 206. Eng, Jr., supra note 158, at 434. 
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their costs because biotechnology research requires more expensive 
resources, such as reagents, equipment, and laboratory space.
207
 He 
further stresses that the open source approach is more difficult to 
apply to the biotechnological field because open source contributions 
in biotechnology are patent-protected, rather than copyright-
protected.
208
 Unlike copyright protection, which seems generally 
compatible with the open source approach, patent protection appears 
to be problematic because small inventors who would be major 
contributors to open source development often fail to obtain patent 
protection for their inventions due to the high cost and knowledge 
barriers associated with obtaining patent protection, and would thus 
be faced with two undesirable choices: disclosing inventions without 
any intellectual property protection or disclosing them subject to 
individually negotiated contracts.
209
 Eng recommends forming a 
confidential ―protected commons‖ of the sort envisioned in the 
CAMBIA BIOS initiative, but Eng nevertheless concludes that such 
an open source model would be far less ―open‖ than the open source 
software movement.
210
 
D. ITPGRFA as an Open Source System of Plant Innovation  
With this overview of the open source software movement and its 
application to the field of biotechnology in mind, this Article now 
turns to an analysis of whether the facilitated access and benefit-
sharing mechanism under the ITPGRFA will successfully function as 
an open source innovation system.  
The ITPGRFA, which was adopted at the FAO conference on 
November 3, 2001, entered into force on June 29, 2004, creating a 
Multilateral System for facilitated access and benefit-sharing with 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 435. 
 209. Id. at 436–37; see also Feldman, supra note 195, at 124. 
 210. Eng, Jr., supra note 158, at 438–39; see also Sara Boettiger & Dan L. Burk, Open 
Source Patenting, 1 J. INT‘L BIOTECH. L. 221, 231 (2004) (concluding that, while open source 
patenting presents a promising and intriguing approach to resolving the tension between the 
communality of science and the economic incentive of patent law, the correspondence between 
the licensing of open source software and that of open source biotechnology is not perfect, as 
the differing nature of patent and copyright shifts the analysis in a variety of ways, some stark 
and some subtle). 
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respect to selected PGRs for food and agricultural purposes, while 
simultaneously recognizing the sovereign rights of each country over 
its own PGRs.
211
 Under this Multilateral System, facilitated access 
must be provided pursuant to a Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement (―SMTA‖), which was adopted by the Governing Body of 
the ITPGRFA, and a recipient who develops commercial products 
using genetic materials from the System must accept the SMTA and 
pay ―an equitable share of the benefits‖ to an FAO trust account.212 
Under the mandate of the ITPGRFA, the Governing Body adopted 
the SMTA in the first session, which was held in June 2006, detailing 
the rights and obligations of both providers and recipients of plant 
genetic materials accessed from the Multilateral System, including 
the rate and modalities for benefit-sharing.
213
 
Notwithstanding several controversial and potentially ambiguous 
provisions, the Multilateral System clearly appears to envision an 
open source approach to plant innovation. Like the open source 
software movement, the Multilateral System seeks to promote 
facilitated access to genetic materials held under the System. 
Facilitated access means that access is to be provided expeditiously, 
free of charge or at a minimal cost, to legal and natural persons under 
the jurisdiction of any member state, on the condition that the 
material, accessed under the Multilateral System and conserved by 
the member, continue to be made available to the System by 
recipients of those materials.
214
 Pursuant to these provisions, the 
genetic resources held under the System would be used as an open 
resource to facilitate plant innovation and to promote both benefit-
sharing and conservation of genetic resources.
215
  
 
 211. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 10. 
 212. Id. arts. 12.4, 13.2(d)(ii), 19.3(f). The ITPGRFA also encourages those who are not 
obliged to voluntarily share their benefit from the Multilateral System. The benefit sharing is 
voluntary for the commercialization of a product that incorporates plant genetic material 
accessed from the Multilateral System when the product is ―available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding.‖ Id. art. 13.2(d)(ii). 
 213. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE U.N. REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNING BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE app. G (2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/gb1/gb1repe.pdf 
[hereinafter SMTA]. 
 214. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(b), (g). 
 215. See Helfer, supra note 140, at 220. 
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A number of potential ambiguities lurking in the language of the 
ITPGRFA could undermine its actual operation. For example, 
according to Article 11.2, only those PGRs listed in Annex I that are 
―under the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in 
the public domain‖ fall within the Multilateral System.216 This 
provision suggests that the prohibition in Article 12.3(d) against 
claiming any intellectual property or other rights that limit facilitated 
access to PGRs, ―or their genetic parts or components, in the form 
received from the Multilateral System‖ is largely surplusage, as the 
PGRs themselves would not, in any event, be entitled to intellectual 
property protection because they are by definition in the public 
domain.
217
 Indeed, Article 12.3(d) seems primarily designed to 
prohibit intellectual property rights in the genetic parts or 
components of these PGRs, at least in the form that these genetic 
parts and components are ―received‖ from the Multilateral System.  
This interpretation of Article 12.3(d) serves to highlight three 
further potential ambiguities in Article 12. First, Article 12.3(d) does 
not preclude the assertion of intellectual property rights as such, but 
merely prohibits recipients from claiming intellectual property rights 
or other legal rights that ―limit facilitated access‖ to PGRs. 
Facilitated access, in turn, is defined in Article 12.3(a) as access 
―solely for the purpose of utilization and conservation for research, 
breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that such 
purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-
food/feed uses.‖218 This definition implies that any intellectual 
property rights that are limited by a sufficiently broad ―experimental 
use‖ privilege would not be prohibited under Article 12.3(d). For 
example, although the UPOV Convention is arguably unclear as to 
what it means by an ―essentially derived‖ variety falling within the 
scope of the registered plant breeder‘s right, the UPOV nevertheless 
clearly creates a broad breeder‘s privilege to use protected plant 
varieties to produce new and distinct varieties that are not ―essentially 
derived,‖ free of any obligation to pay royalties. Thus, UPOV-
compliant plant variety protection would arguably not ―limit‖ 
 
 216. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 11.2 (emphasis added). 
 217. Id. art. 12.3(d). 
 218. Id. art. 12.3(a). 
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facilitated access to PGRs and would thus not give rise to any 
obligation to share benefits arising out of the commercialization of 
plant varieties derived from the Multilateral System. In other words, 
Article 12.3(d) seems primarily aimed at barring patent protection—
or at least patent protection that is not subject to an experimental use 
privilege that is at least as broad as the UPOV breeders‘ privilege—
on any genetic parts or components of PGRs, at least in the form 
―received‖ from the Multilateral System.  
A second potential ambiguity in the language of Article 12 arises 
with respect to which plant innovations that are derived from PGRs 
accessed from the Multilateral System must be obligatorily 
incorporated into the System and which plant innovations will escape 
the Multilateral System but give rise to an obligation to share benefits 
arising out of the commercialization of a plant variety derived from 
the Multilateral System. Neither the ITPGRFA nor the SMTA 
provide a clear answer to this question.
219
 However, Article 12.3(g) 
of the ITPGRFA and Article 6.3 of the SMTA seem to require 
recipients of genetic material from the Multilateral System to make 
 
 219. The meaning of the term ―in the form received‖ was one of the most contentious 
issues during the negotiations of the ITPGRFA. Although the resulting compromise between 
developing countries and developed countries was expected to be further interpreted by the 
Governing Body, the SMTA adopted by the Governing Body simply replicates the 
corresponding wordings in the ITPGRFA without further clarification. See Kennedy, supra note 
146, at 28. According to Kennedy,  
While all participating countries agreed that it should not be possible to patent genetic 
materials in the form received under the [Multilateral System], disagreement existed 
among them as to whether and when DNA sequences could be patented. There are two 
genetic material categories to consider: ―parts and components‖ (patenting of raw 
DNA sequences simply extracted from PGRs) and ―derivatives‖ (where extracted 
DNA is combined with other DNA to create a new PGR). The first category is 
probably excluded by the language of the [ITPGRFA], although some developed 
countries interpret it as allowing some patents, even though this interpretation would 
seem to run counter to the spirit of the treaty. The position with the second is more 
vague, with the European Union taking the position that if parts and components are 
the subject of innovation, they can be the subject of [intellectual property rights]. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(d) (―Recipients shall not claim 
any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant generic 
resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received 
from the Multilateral System.‖); SMTA, supra note 213, art. 6.2 (―The Recipient shall not 
claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the Material 
provided under this Agreement, or its genetic parts or components, in the form received from 
the Multilateral System.‖). 
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the material available to the System only when the recipients 
conserve the actual material supplied.
220
 This, in turn, suggests that 
virtually any plant innovation based on materials derived from the 
Multilateral System could escape the System if the source materials 
themselves are not conserved but may (or may not) be subject to 
Article 13.2(d)‘s obligation to share monetary benefits,221 depending 
on whether any intellectual property rights are claimed in the plant 
innovation and whether those intellectual property rights ―limit‖ 
facilitated access. In short, the Multilateral System appears to be 
more analogous to the Open Source Definition than to the Free 
Software Definition governing software development, in that the 
ITPGRFA does not contain a ―viral‖ clause to ensure that any 
product derived from open source data will be available under the 
same license terms.
222
  
A third and more fundamental (albeit apparently intended) 
ambiguity lurking in the language of Article 12.3(d) arises from the 
fact that it prohibits the assertion of intellectual property rights that 
limit facilitated access to either the PGRs ―or their genetic parts or 
components,‖ at least ―in the form received‖ from the System.223 
There is, of course, considerable disagreement between developing 
and developed countries as to the precise meaning of the two phrases, 
―their genetic parts or components,‖ and ―in the form received.‖ 
Developing countries argue that the two phrases would bar any 
patents on isolated genetic parts or components derived from the 
Multilateral System, while developed countries adhere to their 
interpretive statement on the official record that nothing in the 
ITPGRFA conflicts with national and international intellectual 
property rights regimes.
224
 No clarifying details were added by the 
 
 220. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(g) (―Plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture accessed under the Multilateral System and conserved shall continue to be made 
available to the Multilateral System by the recipients of those plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, under the terms of this Treaty.‖); SMTA, supra note 213, art. 6.3 (―In the case 
that the Recipient conserves the Material supplied, the Recipient shall make the Material . . . 
available to the Multilateral System using the Standard Material Transfer Agreement.‖). 
 221. See ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 13.2(d).  
 222. See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text. 
 223. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(d). 
 224. See Helfer, supra note 140, at 221. 
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Governing Body that drafted the SMTA.
225
 Reflecting the view of 
developed countries, however, Article 12.3(f) specifies that ―[a]ccess 
to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture protected by 
intellectual and other property rights shall be consistent with relevant 
international agreements, and with relevant national laws.‖226 Given 
that the insertion of the phrase ―in the form received‖ was insisted 
upon mainly by developed countries, ―in light of their position that 
[Article 12.3(d)] should not prevent [PGRs], or their genetic parts or 
components, from being the subject of intellectual property rights, 
provided that the criteria relating to such rights are met,‖227 the phrase 
―in the form received‖ will probably be interpreted to allow patent 
claims if a product that incorporates PGRs accessed from the 
Multilateral System is the result of ―significant, inventive 
manipulation.‖228 After all, contrary interpretation would seriously 
undermine the other distinctive feature of the ITPGRFA—namely the 
obligation to share monetary benefits arising out of the 
commercialization of certain products derived from PGRs obtained 
through the Multilateral System.  
It is this feature, in turn, that most significantly distinguishes the 
Multilateral System from the standard Open Source Definition of 
software development. Under Article 13.2(d)(ii) of the ITPGRFA, 
 
 225. SMTA, supra note 213, art. 6.2; see supra note 219. 
 226. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 12.3(f); see Helfer, supra note 115, at 40–41 (―To avoid 
the possibility that this language might be read to conflict with TRIPs or domestic patent 
statutes, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States appended interpretive statements after 
the final round of negotiations indicating . . . that nothing in the ITPGR[FA] is inconsistent with 
national or international intellectual property laws.‖). 
 227. Intellectual Property and Development: Overview of Developments in Multilateral, 
Plurilateral, and Bilateral Fora, S. CENTRE AND CENTER FOR INT‘L & ENVTL. L. INTELL. PROP. 
Q. UPDATE (S. Centre & Ctr. for Int‘l & Envtl. Intellectual Prop. Law), 3d Quarter, 2004, at 5–6 
[hereinafter Intellectual Property and Development]. 
 228. See Brush, supra note 33, at 83. However, it must be noted that the interpretation of 
the phrase ―in the form received‖ in Article 12.3(d) squarely reflects ongoing disagreement 
between developing countries and developed countries about patentability criteria of life forms 
in the review of Article 27.3(b), and the controversial invention versus discovery debate in the 
ongoing negotiations in the World Intellectual Property Organization for a Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty. It is difficult to say whether and to what extent the phrase ―in the form received‖ 
limits patent rights in genetic materials accessed from the Multilateral System without 
resolution of these issues. Intellectual Property and Development, supra note 227, at 6. See 
GERALD MOORE & WITOLD TYMOWSKI, EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 93 (2005), available at 
http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-057.pdf; Rose, supra note 150, at 621. 
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recipients of genetic material accessed from the System are obliged to 
share financial benefits arising from the commercialization of such 
genetic material if the commercialized product is covered by 
intellectual property rights restricting the free access for further 
research and breeding.
229
 The concept of facilitated access and 
benefit-sharing under the Multilateral System is based upon the 
premise that each country has sovereign rights over its PGRs.
230
 
Thus, unlike the open source software movement under the Open 
Source Definition, the Multilateral System recognizes a kind of 
sovereign proprietary right in PGRs held under the System and levies 
a monetary fee for having benefited commercially from having 
accessed these genetic resources. In this respect, the Multilateral 
System is more accurately viewed as a hybrid approach to 
agricultural innovation, combining open source and proprietary 
elements.
231
  
In order to accomplish benefit-sharing under the Multilateral 
System, it is critical to establish who must share benefits growing out 
of commercial uses of the communal genetic materials under the 
System. As the controversy over the phrase ―in the form received‖ 
reveals, however, neither the ITPGRFA nor the SMTA make clear 
who will be obliged to share benefits arising from commercial uses. 
Article 13.2(d)(ii) of the ITPGRFA merely requires a recipient who 
commercializes a product that incorporates a plant genetic material 
accessed from the Multilateral System to pay an equitable share of 
 
 229. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 13.2.(d)(ii). Some commentators argue that ―[t]his 
requirement may violate TRIPs by placing an obligation on holders of [intellectual property 
rights] in PGRs over and above what is required of other patent holders, which is not permitted 
under article 27.1 of TRIPs.‖ Kennedy, supra note 146, at 31 (citing Helfer, supra note 115, at 
41). 
 230. See ITPGRFA, supra note 10, pmbl. para. 14 (―Recognizing that, in the exercise of 
their sovereign rights over their [PGRs], states may mutually benefit from the creation of an 
effective multilateral system for facilitated access to a negotiated selection of these resources 
and for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use.‖ (emphasis 
removed)). 
 231. In this regard, some commentators describe the Multilateral System as a form of 
―limited common property.‖ See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 140, at 219 (―The multilateral system 
is a form of ‗limited common property‘ composed of 64 food and feed crops‖); Kennedy, supra 
note 147, at 27 (―This treaty creates ‗a special collective property right for a limited number of 
staple food and feed crops‘; it is a type of limited common property right within these defined 
PGRs.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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the benefits arising from the commercialization of that product into 
the FAO trust account, unless ―such a product is available without 
restriction to others for further research and breeding, in which case 
the recipient who commercializes shall be encouraged to make such 
payment.‖232 The SMTA states that ―a Product is considered to be 
available without restriction to others for further research and 
breeding when it is available for research and breeding without any 
legal or contractual obligations, or technological restrictions, that 
would preclude using it in the manner specified in the Treaty.‖233  
As we have seen, the UPOV-based plant variety protection 
(―PVP‖) system contains a broad research exemption that allows 
other breeders to use and reproduce protected varieties for plant 
breeding or other bona fide research, without any obligation to pay 
royalties on resulting new varieties, so long as they are not 
―essentially derived‖ from a protected variety.234 Consequently, a 
product protected under the PVP system would arguably meet the 
requirement of being ―available without restriction‖ under the 
Multilateral System.
235
 Thus, if a commercialized product based on 
genetic resources derived from the Multilateral System is protected 
by a UPOV-compliant PVP system, a recipient of those resources is 
not obliged, but only encouraged, to share any of the monetary 
benefits arising out of commercial use of those genetic resources.  
 
 232. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 13.2(d)(ii) (emphasis added). In addition, this provision 
specifies that, in case the commercialized product is available without restriction to others for 
further research and breeding, the recipient who commercializes the product is encouraged to 
make such payment. Id. 
 233. SMTA, supra note 213, art. 2. 
 234. See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2006); UPOV, supra note 67, art. 5; see also supra note 88 
(discussing the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes an ―essentially derived‖ variety 
under the UPOV Agreement). 
 235. Berne Declaration, a Swiss non-governmental organization that aims to promote more 
equitable, sustainable and democratic North-South relations, agrees with this assertion. See 
FRANCOIS MEIENBERG, ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING UNDER THE FAO SEED TREATY 4 
(2006), available at http://www.evb.ch/cm_data/ABS_under_the_ITPGR_engl_2_2_2.pdf 
(asserting that ―[i]t was quite clear during the negotiations for the Treaty that ‗without 
restriction for further research and breeding‘ means that a product is available for further 
breeding by . . . PVP laws, which allow the breeder the right to sell new varieties developed 
from this product without restriction‖). But see Intellectual Property and Development, supra 
note 227, at 6–7 (arguing that ―[i]t is not clear . . . that these exceptions are sufficient to prevent 
these intellectual property rights from being classified as ‗rights that limit the facilitated access‘ 
to [PGRs]‖).  
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Instances in which plant products derived from PGRs obtained 
from the Multilateral system are covered by patents, on the other 
hand, are likely to trigger an obligation to share monetary benefits.
236
 
This is so, even though the patent laws in many jurisdictions, 
including most developing countries and even some developed 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan,
237
 
contain broad research exemptions, for even the broadest of these 
research exemptions are narrower than the breeders‘ exemption 
specified in the UPOV Convention. Certainly, the benefit-sharing 
obligation would be triggered where a patent on a product derived 
from the Multilateral System is subject only to a narrow or qualified 
research exemption, as in the United States.
238
 
To summarize, the Multilateral System under the ITPGRFA 
adopts a hybrid open source and propriety approach to plant 
innovation, seeking to maintain the openness of genetic materials 
held under its System for the conservation and sustainable use of 
PGRs for food and agriculture, while obliging a recipient who 
commercializes a patented product that incorporates plant genetic 
 
 236. See H. David Cooper, The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture, 11 REV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2002) (―[O]n the 
basis of the negotiating history of this provision . . . it is understood that such mandatory 
monetary benefit sharing would be invoked when commercialized products are protected by 
patents.‖). 
 237. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United 
States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and 
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 969–70 (2004) (―Most of the world‘s leading patent 
systems, including both civil and common law jurisdictions, have codified in their patent codes 
a general experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability. . . . Developing 
country patent regimes have followed the approach of the industrialized nations‘ patent 
systems.‖ (footnotes omitted)). However, even broad experimental use exceptions to patent 
protection generally do not include the privilege to commercially develop a derivative product 
free of any obligation to pay royalties, as under UPOV, which would arguably be required to 
avoid the obligation to share monetary benefits. 
 238. See MEIENBERG, supra note 235, at 4; Rose, supra note 150, at 620 (―The payment 
exception for [PGRs], ‗available without restriction,‘ is purported to ensure mandatory payment 
by holders of plant patents but not by holders of plant breeders‘ rights.‖); see also Mueller, 
supra note 237, at 927 (―[T]he notion of a well-defined [experimental use] exemption from 
liability for certain uses of innovation protected by patents never received wide application or 
statutory codification [in the United States] as it did with respect to copyrighted works.‖). Even 
in jurisdictions in which a patent does not contain a research exemption, it is unclear ―whether a 
patent holder in such jurisdictions could renounce those [rights to exclude a research 
exemption] and thus escape the mandatory benefit-sharing provision.‖ MOORE & TYMOWSKI, 
supra note 228, at 111. 
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material accessed from the System to pay an equitable share of the 
benefits arising from the commercialization of that product into the 
FAO trust. Thus, to determine whether the Multilateral System will 
work efficiently, it is important to ascertain whether the FAO trust 
account will accumulate enough money to accomplish its initial 
purpose of promoting benefit-sharing.  
Under the SMTA, a recipient, its affiliates, contractors, licensees 
and lessees are required to pay 1.1% of the sales of the product, with 
an additional 30% subtraction, into the trust account established by 
the Governing Body, when a patented product containing plant 
genetic material accessed from the System is commercialized.
239
 
Unfortunately, under the current SMTA, the Multilateral System is 
unlikely to generate significant benefits, at least in the short term,
240
 
and perhaps in the long term as well. This is so for a number of 
reasons: First, as a practical matter, there is a significant waiting 
period between initial access to genetic resources and eventual 
commercialization.
241
 Second, ―identifying the contribution of a 
specific resource within the complex pedigree of an improved crop 
variety poses a major obstacle‖ in determining who, and how much, 
will share in the commercialized benefits.
242
 A third significant 
unresolved issue is the extent to which the benefit-sharing obligation 
under the Multilateral System will be ―transferred through a chain of 
varieties.‖243 Neither the ITPGRFA nor the SMTA clearly indicates 
whether this obligation would continue through successive varieties, 
 
 239. SMTA, supra note 213, art. 6.7, annex 2. 
 240. See Rose, supra note 150, at 622 (―[T]he PGR Treaty can be considered as having 
inherited the weaknesses of both its parent instruments in relation to benefit-sharing. . . . [The 
treatment of] monetary benefits [under the Multilateral System] remains inchoate.‖); Cooper, 
supra note 236, at 11 (―[D]uring a considerable period of time following the entry into force of 
the Treaty, mandatory payments triggered by commercial use may turn out to be a small part of 
the total benefit-sharing package.‖). 
 241. Brush, supra note 33, at 83. 
 242. Id.; Cooper, supra note 236, at 11 (―There will clearly be a lag between transfer of 
[PGRs] and the realization of benefit sharing due to the time needed for research, development 
and commercialization.‖); see also Rose, supra note 150, at 608 (stating that the Multilateral 
System ―foresaw many difficulties in evaluating the benefits to be shared‖). 
 243. See INT‘L PLANT GENETIC RES. INST., ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND 
THE EQUITABLE SHARING OF BENEFITS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON SYSTEMS FOR 
THE EXCHANGE OF GERMPLASM 83 (1996), available at http://www.bioversityinternational. 
org/fileadmin/bioversity/publications/pdfs/467.pdf. 
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even if the actual proportion of the original germplasm constituting 
the new varieties produced inevitably decreases.
244
  
It should also be noted that, although the System covers most 
crops that are vital to world food security,
245
 benefit-sharing under 
the Multilateral System does not yet cover many crops, including 
both ex situ private collections of crops listed in the ITPGRFA and 
such non-listed crops as soybeans, groundnuts, sugar cane, wild 
relatives of cassava, tomatoes, and industrial crops including tea, 
coffee, oil-palm and rubber.
246
 Moreover, even those crops that are 
within the Multilateral System and that can be used for profitable 
applications other than as food or feed, for example pharmaceutical 
or industrial products, ―remain outside the scope of the benefit-
sharing [obligations] of the Multilateral System.‖247 Finally, and most 
importantly, a Swiss NGO, called the Berne Declaration, estimates 
that the amount of money that would annually be put into the FAO 
trust account will probably not even cover the administrative budget 
for the Multilateral System.
248
 Moreover, as Professor Aoki notes, the 
benefit-sharing provisions of the Multilateral System arguably pay 
―mere lip service to the idea of farmers‘ rights,‖ even if the amount of 
money accruing from the Multilateral System somehow turns out to 
be significant.
249
 Although the ITPGRFA states that benefits arising 
from the Multilateral System ―should flow primarily, directly and 
 
 244. Id.; cf. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 13; SMTA, supra note 213, arts. 2, 6, annex 2. 
 245. See ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 11, annex 1. 
 246. See Rose, supra note 150, at 616, 622. ITPGRFA contains a built-in review agenda 
that mandates the Governing Body to assess the progress on the Multilateral System within two 
years of the entry into force of the Treaty, and following the review, to decide whether or not 
access shall continue to be facilitated to those natural and legal persons who were initially 
encouraged to include their PGRs in the Multilateral System. See ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 
11.4. 
 247. See Rose, supra note 150, at 622. 
 248. See MEIENBERG, supra note 235, at 5, for an illustration of this financial problem: 
A rough and optimistic calculation may illustrate this point: ten years from now the 
global seed market (in US-dollars) will be worth some 30 billion dollars. Ten percent 
or 3 billion dollars worth of seed will have been bred with genetic resources from the 
multilateral system, of which, again, only 10% ($ 300 million) are protected by a 
patent and thus subject to benefit sharing at 0.77%. The resulting 2.31 million dollars 
per year do not even cover the treaty administrative budget. 
Id. 
 249. Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic, supra note 3, at 796. 
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indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing 
countries,‖250 under the current SMTA, at least, farmers are unlikely 
to receive direct financial benefits and the benefits to farmers will 
thus accrue only indirectly, ―through ‗trickle down‘ information 
exchange, technology transfer, and capacity-building via the 
scientific community.‖251  
Consequently, although the Multilateral System under the 
ITPGRFA is a commendable effort to avoid the high transaction costs 
associated with market-based bilateral contracts,
252
 it is unclear 
whether it will in fact succeed in combining open source and 
proprietary approaches to plant innovation. As Opderbeck and Eng 
argue with respect to open source biotechnology, it may likewise be 
the case that agricultural innovation is not a particularly good 
candidate for an open source approach, due to the greater complexity 
of biological innovation and the inevitable reliance on patent, rather 
than copyright, protection. It does bear noting that the Multilateral 
System is distinguishable from conventional biotechnology 
innovation in one important respect, as the cost of obtaining patent 
protection will be borne by the commercial user, rather than the 
contributor, of PGRs. More importantly, the success of the 
Multilateral System will ultimately hinge on the benefit-sharing 
scheme, which is unlikely to generate significant monetary benefits, 
at least in the short term, and perhaps in the long term as well, as the 
benefit-sharing obligation is limited to those who restrict the access 
to their commercialized product through patents that can be shown to 
have been derived in some way from PGRs obtained from the 
Multilateral System. Enforcement of this obligation will itself impose 
considerable transaction costs on developing country governments if 
it is to be effective.
253
  
 
 250. ITPGRFA, supra note 10, art. 13.3. 
 251. Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic, supra note 3, at 796–97. 
 252. Id. at 797. 
 253. To reduce these transaction costs, a number of proposals have been made to impose an 
international obligation on members of the World Trade Organization and/or the Paris 
Convention, that patent applicants disclose the origin of any genetic resources or associated 
traditional knowledge on which the patented invention is based and produce evidence of prior 
informed consent of the sources of the genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge. 
While imposing such an obligation as a condition for obtaining a patent would arguably be 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement (at least as it currently stands), and more importantly 
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Nevertheless, the ITPGRFA is a commendable, if imperfect, 
attempt to moderate a potentially corrosive international phenomenon 
that one commentator has called ―hyperownership in a time of 
biotechnological promise.‖254 As we have seen, the fundamental issue 
is ―who should own or control access to the subcellular genetic 
sequences that direct the structure and characteristics of all living 
things.‖255 Developed countries are seeking to privatize plant and 
other genetic resources through imposition of the minimum patent 
standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement. In response, 
developing countries, which house most of the world‘s wild or raw 
genetic resources, are increasingly asserting sovereign ownership 
over these raw genetic resources.
256
 ―This interactive spiral of 
increased enclosure, or ‗hyperownership,‘‖ could potentially result in 
the ―suboptimal utilization, conservation, and improvement of vital 
genetic materials.‖257 In any event, the phenomenon reflects current 
 
would impose its own crushing administrative burden on patent examiners in both developing 
and developed countries, imposing such a disclosure of origin and prior informed consent 
requirement as a condition for enforcing an otherwise valid patent would arguably reduce the 
transaction costs entailed in enforcing the benefit-sharing provisions of the ITGRFA. See 
generally Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 371 (2000); Nuno Pires de Carvalho, 
From the Shaman‟s Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPS-Consistent Requirement to 
Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL‘Y 111 (2005).  
 254. See Safrin, supra note 48, at 641. See generally Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How 
Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917 (2007) [hereinafter Safrin, Chain 
Reaction]. 
 255. Safrin, supra note 48, at 641. 
 256. Id. at 642. 
 257. Id. It should be noted, however, that, as with concerns over ―genetic erosion,‖ see 
supra note 19 and accompanying text, and the potential for a ―tragedy of the anticommons‖ and 
―patent thickets‖ in biotechnology research, see supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text, 
Safrin is ultimately making an empirical claim here. Although Safrin cites abundant anecdotal 
evidence of the international phenomenon of hyperownership and offers a fascinating 
theoretical explanation for it, see generally Safrin, Chain Reaction, supra note 254, her 
conclusion that this spiral could potentially result in the suboptimal utilization, conservation, 
and improvement of important plant genetic resources is based at least in part on the debatable 
assumption that the expansion of patent rights in the genetic area ―is, or at a minimum, risks 
creating an anticommons in genetic material that deters innovation.‖ See id. at 1961. She also 
offers anecdotal evidence that the ―second wave of property rights [demanded by the 
developing world in response to the expansion of intellectual property rights] appears to have 
little to do with any efficient economic calculus.‖ Id. at 1957. In the absence of persuasive 
empirical evidence to support the first part of her hypothesis, Safrin does not succeed in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing 463 
 
 
international tensions between the developing and developed worlds, 
as the expansion of intellectual and other property rights take on an 
―internally generative dynamic,‖ in which the demand for property 
rights by some engenders the demand for related property rights by 
others,
258
 even if ―the second wave of property rights appears to have 
little to do with any efficient economic calculus.‖259 Before altogether 
abandoning the FAO‘s Multilateral System, it at least behooves the 
international community to make a sober assessment of the 
alternative. At the moment, at least, that alternative can only be 
described as profoundly bipolar, preoccupied as it is with continuing 
controversies over the patentability of genetic materials and reactive 
assertions of sovereignty over raw PGRs. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of intellectual property rights for plant innovation, the 
commercialization of seeds, the increasing use of genetic resources in 
crop breeding, and the declining availability of crop genetic resources 
have engendered increasing doubt about the wisdom of adhering to 
the concept of ―common heritage‖ in developing countries. Many 
developing countries have contended that free access to their PGRs 
by developed countries in the name of ―common heritage‖ is 
tantamount to exploitation. Asserting that a host of their PGRs have 
been appropriated without permission, they denounce these 
unauthorized and uncompensated appropriations as ―bio-piracy,‖ and 
insist on international recognition of their sovereign ownership of any 
and all genetic resources found within their national borders.  
With the rise of such claims by developing countries, there is an 
increasing need for international rules that guarantee access to 
genetic resources and ensure an equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from that access. In an effort to respond to this need, the ITPGRFA, a 
new multinational agreement in the biotechnology field, has 
 
establishing her initial conclusion that ―[t]hese twin systems of hyperownership interact in a 
corrosive fashion,‖ see Safrin, supra note 48, at 685, but only that even economically justified 
property claims run the risk of generating economically unjustified second-wave 
hyperownership claims. 
 258. See Safrin, Chain Reaction, supra note 254, at 1921. 
 259. Id. at 1957. 
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established a Multilateral System for facilitated access and benefit-
sharing with respect to selected PGRs. As with other open source 
biotechnology projects, such as the International HapMap Project, 
CAMBIA/BIOS, UAEM, and TDI, the prospects for the Multilateral 
System are uncertain. Whereas those private biotechnology projects 
attempt to make open source use of patents, however, the monetary 
benefit-sharing feature of the Multilateral System will ultimately 
depend on proprietary patenting of genetic products, about which the 
ITPGRFA itself seems ambivalent. As a result, it is not at all clear 
that the benefit-sharing scheme under the Multilateral System will in 
fact provide direct and substantial financial benefits to farmers in 
developing countries. On the other hand, it is likewise unclear that a 
bilateral approach to promoting plant innovation and the conservation 
of PGRs, with its attendant controversies over private patenting of 
genetic material and reactive assertions of sovereignty over raw 
PGRs, is preferable to the FAO‘s Multilateral System. 
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